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ARTICLES
DOES THE RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION INCLUDE
'l'HE RIGHT TO ENSURE THE DEATH OF THE FETUS?
Stephen G. Gilles *
"Freedom to choose what is to happen to one's body is one thing;
freedom to insist on the death of a being that is capable of living
outside one's body is another. At present these two are inextricably
linked, and so the woman's freedom to choose conflicts head-on
with the alleged right to life of the fetus. When ectogenesis [gestation in an artificial womb] becomes possible, these two issues will
break apart, and women will choose to terminate their pregnancies without thereby choosing the inevitable death of the fetuses
they are carrying. "1
"Women understand that abortion terminates pregnancy and
that some form of life-for some a human life with full human attributes, for others, something more inchoate-is extinguished by
virtue of the procedure; that is its very point. ,.e
"'[T]he abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the
growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead
r. t 11!3
1 e us.

* © Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University
School of Law. B.A., St. Johns College, Maryland; J.D., The University of Chicago. Thanks
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participants in the 2012 University Faculty for Life Conference at Brigham Young University Law School, for helpful comments.
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3. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 483 n.7 (1983)
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States describes a woman's
constitutional right to an elective abortion as a right to terminate
her pregnancy prior to viability. 4 That description begs a question
that may someday be as important in practice as it is in principle:
whether the right to an elective abortion includes the right to
"terminate"-that is, kill or otherwise ensure the death of-the
pre-viable fetus. 5 In today's world, the conduct that would squarely present this question-killing a pre-viable fetus although it
could have survived an abortion and become a child-cannot occur in practice. The right to elective abortion applies only to fetuses that are not viable, which means, by definition, that they
have been determined to have no realistic chance of surviving
outside the uterus, even with the help of neonatal intensive care. 6
Today's abortion methods almost invariably involve the violent
killing of the fetus. 7 But even if abortion providers used fetus(plurality opinion) (quoting, seemingly with distaste, the testimony of abortion provider
Dr. Robert Crist).
4. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality opin·
ion) ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central
principle of Roe v. Wade."); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (holding generally that a woman may terminate her pregnancy before viability).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, I will use the term "fetus" to refer to the human or·
ganism at every stage of development from conception to birth. Accord Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (1979) (employing this usage).
6. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (viability requires "a realistic possibility" of survival
outside the womb); Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (a fetus is viable if it is "potentially able to live
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid").
7. During the first trimester, when about 90% of abortions are performed, the standard method is "vacuum aspiration," in which a vacuum tube is inserted into the uterus
and the fetus, placenta, and amniotic sac are evacuated. Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 923
(2000). The overwhelming majority of second-trimester abortions are done by "dilation and
evacuation" ("D&E"), in which the abortion doctor uses instruments to pull the fetus out of
the ute;us. Id: at 924. After the fifteenth week, the fetus is typically too large to be removed mtact; m that event, the instruments are used to dismember it and the pieces are
pulled through the cervix. Id. at 925. Occasionally, abortion doctors use the partial-birth
ab~rtion tech~ique, which is a subset of what they prefer to call "intact D&E." Id. at 927.
'fh1s method mvolves removing the fetus intact from the uterus, in breech position, until
the head lodges in the cervix. The doctor then pierces the skull with a scissors, and vacuums out the brain, after which the collapsed skull can be pulled through the cervix. Id.
The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003, upheld against constitutional challenges
m Carhart II, makes it illegal to perform a partial-birth abortion on a living fetus. See
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 124, 164 (2007). But even when Carhart I was decided in 2000, it
was common practice to administer a lethal injection to the fetus after the twentieth week
"~o facilitate ~vacuation," see 530 U.S. at 925, and nowadays the standard late-term abort10n protocol mcludes a pre-abortion lethal fetal injection. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 92425; David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future o/ Abortion
Law, 2007 S. CT. REV. 1, 31 (2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). Finally, in a small
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sparing methods rather than fetus-killing ones, aborted fetuses
would die within minutes after being removed from their mothers' wombs. 8 Consequently, whether or not the woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy includes a legal entitlement to kill the
pre-viable fetus, elective abortion inevitably results in fetal death
in practice. For that very reason, the woman has no choice in the
matter: should she elect to terminate her pregnancy, the fetus
will die even if she wants it to survive. 9
Yet it would be a mistake to infer that this question is merely
academic. Even if the legal consequences were identical, there is
a momentous moral difference between a right to elective abortion that is limited to removing or expelling an unwanted fetus
prior to viability, and a right that also entitles the woman affirmatively to kill it under at least some circumstances. Beyond that,
already today, and even more as reproductive technologies advance, these opposing visions of the right to elective abortion have
dramatically different legal implications.
Consider first two technological breakthroughs that may occur
in the not-so-distant future: (1) improved surgical techniques that
enable fetuses to be removed from their mothers' wombs intact
and alive at any stage of gestation; and (2) artificial wombs in
which these fetuses can be gestated to term. 10 Imagine further
minority of second-trimester cases the abortion doctor induces labor prematurely. Carhart
I, 530 U.S. at 924. Whether this method kills the fetus before delivery depends on how labor is induced. In the 1970s, when inducing labor was the most common second-trimester
abortion method, the standard protocol was to inject saline solution into the amniotic sac.
Id. This "instillation" method typically resulted in fetal death in utero from chemical
burns or saline poisoning.
8. I will use the term "fetus-sparing abortion" to refer to a procedure (including induction of labor) in which the physician attempts prematurely to terminate a pregnancy
by removing the fetus from the woman's body intact and alive, and the term "fetus-killing
abortion" to refer to a procedure one of whose objectives is to kill the fetus either before or
during its removal from the woman's body.
9. The Court may have overlooked this fact when it stated in Harris v. McRae that
"[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life." 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980). The
death of the fetus is very often-but not always-among the woman's purposes. In some
cases, the woman chooses abortion knowing the fetus will die as a result, but would spare
it if she could do so without carrying the pregnancy to term.
10. Researchers have reported some progress in recent years, and some observers
have predicted that artificial wombs will be developed within the next few decades. Jeremy Rifkin, 'The End of Pregnancy: Within a Generation There Will Be [sic] Probably Be
Mass Use of Artificial Wombs to Grow Babies, GUAHDIAN (Jan. 16, 2002), available at
www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/17/gender.medicalscience. Others continue to believe, as the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law asserted in its 1988 report on
Fetal Extrauterine Survivability, that "no technology exists to bridge the development gap
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that the costs of these dual artificial-womb technol~gies-which I
will refer to as "AW"-while much higher than th~se of a fetuskilling abortion, are low enough to enable the widespread use of
AW; 11 that AW gives fetuses at all stages of gestation a realistic
chance of survival to full term and beyond; and that the fetussparing abortion methods used in tandem with AW are very safe
for women (even if not as safe as fetus-killing abortions). Under
those circumstances, AW would be a feasible, effective, and safe
alternative to today's fetus-killing abortion methods-and would
mean that pre-viable fetuses are rescuable via AW. 12 If they are
aborted using fetus-killing methods such as those now in use,
they will die. If instead they are subjected to fetus-sparing abortions, many of them will survive and be transferred to artificial
wombs for gestation to full term.

between the three-day embryo culture and the 24th week of gestation" and that complete
extrauterine development is not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. NEW YOHK
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW FETAL EXTRAUTEHINE SURVIVA13ILITY 3 (1988)
(quoted in Webster v. Reprod. Health Ser~s., 492 U.S. 490, 554 n.9 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part)). In short, it remains unclear whether or when artificial wombs will
become practicable. For a useful discussion of the research that has been done on artificial
wombs, see Jessica H. Schultz, Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 877, 878-83 (2010).
11. It seems axiomatic that a procedure that must comply with the additional requirement that the fetus be removed alive and intact will, on average, be more difficult
and hence more expensive than a procedure in which efficacy and maternal safety are the
only objectives. And then there are the costs of gestating a fetus for up to nine months in
an artificial womb. Precisely because an artificial womb would more successfully imitate
natu.re than contemporary neonatal care can, one might predict that its costs would be appreciably smaller than the roughly $200,000 average cost of caring for an extremely premature newborn in the United States. See William M. Gilbert, Thomas S. Nesbitt, & Beate
Danielsen, The Cost of Prematurity: Quantification by Gestational Age and Birth Weight,
10~ ~~STETHICS & GYNECOLOGY 488, 490 (2003). Nevertheless, between the costs of the
artificrnl wombs themselves and the monitoring that they would presumably require, one
would expect the average cost of gestation in an artificial womb to be quite high. See generally General & Human Biology Bioethics Case Studies: Artificial Wombs, MCGRAW HILL,
h~t?://www.mhhe.com/biosci/genbio/olc_linkedcontents/bioethics_cases/g-bioe-17.htm (last
v1s.1ted Apr. ~· 2015) ("If artificial wombs for humans become a reality, they are likely to be
quite expensive.") .
. 12 .. For more than th~rty years, commentators have pointed out that artificial wombs
will raise the legal quest10n whether the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy includes a right to ensure the death of the fetus. See, e.g., Robert J. Favole, Note, Artificial
Gestation: New Meaning for the Right to Terminate Pregnancy, 21 Amz. L. REV. 755
(1979); Mark A. Goldstein, Note, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right
and State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
877. (1978). Others have focused on the parallel moral question that will arise once AW is
available. See, e.g., CHHISTOPHER KACZOR, THE EDGE OF LIFE: HUMAN DIGNI'l'Y AND
CO~TEMPORARY BIOETHICS 107 (2005) (discussing whether, if artificial wombs become
available, defenders of a moral right to abortion will accept that it is limited to "evacuation
abortion," or insist that it includes "terminative abortion").
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If every fetus that can survive outside its biological mother's
womb is ipso facto viable, these new technologies would mean
that states could ban elective abortion even early in pregnancy.
As I argue elsewhere, however, under Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, fetal viability
includes an implicit developmental requirement: although the
Court has never specified what that requirement is, this article
will assume that the fetus must have developed sufficiently that
it can survive outside any womb, even if it initially requires some
less comprehensive type of artificial aid. 13 Consequently, the right
to elective abortion will continue to apply to fetuses that are not
yet developmentally viable-even though these fetuses can be
rescued via AW.

Suppose that a state sought to protect these rescuable fetuses
by enacting legislation prohibiting fetus-killing abortion methods,
and providing AW at the state's expense to any woman who chose
to terminate her pregnancy. 14 If the right to elective abortion includes a specific right to ensure the death of the pre-viable fetus,
such a "fetal-rescue program" would plainly be unconstitutional.
Conversely, a fetal-rescue program would unquestionably be constitutional if the right to elective abortion affords no protection to
the woman's liberty interest in ensuring the death of her fetus. 15
If, as this article argues, the answer lies in between these extremes, the outcome should turn on whether the woman's protected liberty interest outweighs the state's interest in rescuing
the fetus via AW.

13. See Stephen G. Gilles, Two Concepts of Viability (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
14. See Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling
Viability's Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 219 (2005) (describing "embryonic extraction legislation" requiring that fetuses be transferred to AW rather than
subjected to traditional abortion methods); Dr. Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controversy, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 24 (2005) (proposing a legal regime that allows
"eviction" (i.e., a fetus-sparing abortion) but prohibits fetus-killing abortions). Son does not
discuss who bears the pecuniary costs of "embryonic extraction." Block and Whitehead assert that the woman should not have to pay the additional costs of "eviction," but envision
that these costs would be defrayed by pro-life groups rather than by the state. See id. at
33.
15. A state law prohibiting fetus-killing abortions, and requiring the woman to pay
the presumably high costs of AW, would fail the undue burden standard even if the right
to elective abortion protects only the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, because it
would make abortions unaffordable for most women.
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Consider next an issue that is already with us: to what extent
states may regulate the treatment and disposition of cryopreserved embryos created in connection with in vitro fertilization: Many women decide not to gestate some of their cryopreserved embryos, and arrange for their destruction or indefinite
cryopreservation. 16 Under Roe and Casey, however, the state has
17
an important interest in protecting all "postconception" fetal life,
and a strong argument can be made that conception is complete
by the time cryopreserved embryos are frozen. 18 If so-and if the
right to elective abortion is limited to terminating an unwanted
pregnancy-states could presumably prohibit the destruction or
indefinite cryopreservation of embryos, and require that unused
embryos be transferred to state custody so that gestational mothers could be found for them. On the other hand, these requirements would presumably be unconstitutional if a woman's right
to elective abortion includes a specific right to ensure the death of
her pre-viable fetus. Here too, this article argues for the intermediate position that the woman's interest in ensuring the death of
her cryopreserved embryos must be weighed against the state's
interest in protecting them.
Parts I-III of this article use a hypothetical AW fetal-rescue
program to explore whether (and if so, to what extent) the right to
elective abortion protects the woman's liberty interest in ensuring
the death of her pre-viable fetus. 19 Although the article argues
that fetal-rescue programs are constitutional under Casey, the
16.. See Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the
La~k of Law in the United States, 76 WASH. L. REV. 759, 759-60 (1998) (detailing couples'
opt10ns when their fertility clinics have leftover embryos including arranging for their
destruction or keeping them frozen).
'
. l '!. See Pl~n.ned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority
opm10n) (descnbmg Roe's "scope" as encompassing "postconception potential life").
18. '1'.he ~xact moment when "conception" is complete is a disputed question on which
the c?nst1tut~onal status ?f cryopreserved embryos will likely turn. See Philip G. Peters,
Jr., 11ie Amb~guou_s Meaning of Human Conception, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199-200 (2006).
~art IV of this article argues that conception is complete by the two-cell stage of embryonic deve~opment: Consequently, cryopreserved embryos-which are typically frozen at the
four-, six-, or eight-cell stage-qualify as "postconception" life for constitutional purposes.
See Lyme M. Thomas, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Abandoned Personal
Property: Should There Be a Connection?, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255, 286 (1997).
I~ ?-dd~tion to th~ so~irces cited_in note 14 supra, recent treatments of the potential
1egal ram1f1cat10ns of art1fic1~l wombs mclude Schultz, supra note 10; Eric Steiger, Not of
Woman Born: How Ectogenesis Will Change the Way We View Viability Birth and the Stat~s ?f the Un?~rn,. 23 J. L. & HEALTH 143, 144 (2010); and Amel Algrhani, i'he Legal and
Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEAL'l'H L & POL'Y 189

:9.

(2007).

'

.
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basis for that conclusion is not a categorical rule that the woman
has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in ensuring the
death of the pre-viable fetus. On the contrary, Part I argues that,
under Casey, her liberty interest is "specially protected," meaning
that state-imposed burdens on that interest are subject to more
than rational basis scrutiny.
Part II then argues that the appropriate form of heightened
scrutiny is the interest-balancing methodology employed in Casey
to reestablish the right to elective abortion, rather than Roe's
strict scrutiny or the "undue burden" test Casey adopts for state
laws that interfere with a woman's ability to obtain an abortion.
Consequently, the constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs
turns on whether the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable
fetus outweighs the woman's protected liberty interest in ensuring its death.
Part III addresses this question. After describing and evaluating the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus and
the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life, analyzing
and applying Casey's implications for the relative strength of
those interests, and presenting arguments bearing on which interest is stronger as a matter of "reasoned judgment," 20 it arrives
at this conclusion: the right to elective abortion does not include a
right to ensure the death of the pre-viable fetus if the fetus is rescuable via state-provided AW, so that rescuing it would directly
advance the state's interest in protecting its life. In other words,
the state's interest in rescuing the pre-viable fetus via AW outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring that it does not survive
21
the termination of her pregnancy.

20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (asserting that the Court must rely on "reasoned judgment" to define the scope of the liberty protected by substantive due process).
21. Many writers have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause rather than the
Due Process Clause is the proper constitutional source of abortion rights. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 375, 382-86 (1985); Sylvia Law, Rethinhing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1036-37 (1984); Heva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective
on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 351-53
(1992). Carhart II, Justice Ginsburg's dissent seemed to endorse this approach, although
without expressly invoking the Equal Protection Clause. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 172
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on
a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature."). This article does not attempt to evaluate the arguments for recasting abortion
rights in equal protection terms. For a critical treatment of them, see Erika Bachiochi,
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In light of this conclusion, Part IV turns to state regulation of
cryopreserved embryos. It argues that cryopreserved embryos
created using current practices, which typically contain four, six,
23
or eight cells, 22 are "postconception potential life," and as such
are within the ambit of the state's interest in protecting (and enabling the development of) pre-viable fetal life. Moreover, the
woman's interest in destroying her cryopreserved embryos (or in
preventing their development by keeping them frozen indefinitely) is no stronger, and on average is likely weaker, than her interest in ensuring the death of a pre-viable fetus. Accordingly, state
legislation prohibiting the destruction of cryopreserved embryos
and requiring that they be gestated within a reasonable time, or
else transferred to the state for adoptive gestation, is constitutional under Casey.
I. UNDER ROE AND CASEY, THE WOMAN'S LIBERTY INTEREST IN
ENSURING THE DEATH OF HER FETUS Is SPECIALLY PROTECTED BY
SOME 'rYPE OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Unlike Roe, 21 Casey does not classify the woman's liberty interest in an elective abortion as "fundamental," and therefore triggering strict scrutiny. 25 Nevertheless, Casey unquestionably
treats that liberty interest as "specially 'protected' by the Consti27
tution"26-that is, triggering a form of heightened scrutiny. Casey reaffirms the right to elective abortion, which it treats as
grounded in an interest-balancing judgment that the woman's
overall liberty interest in an elective abortion outweighs the
state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus. 28 Under Casey,
Embodied Equality: Debunhing Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV.
J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 889, 891, 949-50 (2011). Neither does this article attempt to work
through the effects such a transformation would have on whether a woman is entitled to
ensure the death of her pre· viable fetus when the state is prepared to rescue it via AW.
22. Peters, supra note 18, at 217 ("[R]obust but unused embroyos are commonly frozen
at the four-, six-, or eight-cell state so that they can be used in the future.").
23. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122 (1973).
. 25. , See Casey, 50.5 U.S. at 8~6 (majority opinion), 869-71 (plurality opinion) (reaffirm·
mg Roes central holdmg but optmg for interest-balancing approach).
26. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" 27. See G_a~ey, 505 l'..8. at 851 (majority opinion) (arguing that abortion is among the
p~rsonal .dec1s1ons relatmg to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearmg, and education," and that these decisions receive heightened "constitutional
protection" because they are "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [and]
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
28. See id. at 857 (majority opinion). Interest balancing is appropriately characterized
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it is interest balancing at a high level of generality-not strict
scrutiny, and not rational basis scrutiny-that justifies the primary protection of the woman's liberty interest: the rule that
state prohibitions on pre-viability elective abortions are unconstitutional. z!l

In addition, however, Casey adopts the undue burden standard
to evaluate laws that regulate (but do not prohibit) elective abortions.:io An abortion law is unconstitutional if it has the purpose or
effect of creating a substantial obstacle to women's access to elec31
tive abortions. Although the undue burden test rests on an interest-balancing judgment, it does not work by balancing interests: all regulations that have "the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus" are unconstitutional. 32 Consequently, if the
woman's liberty to ensure the death of her fetus is among the interests protected by the right to an elective abortion, it will be
necessary to determine which approach-interest balancing or
the undue burden standard-applies to laws (such as fetal-rescue
programs) that interfere with that interest. Part II will take up
that question. The prior question, which this part addresses, is
whether the woman's liberty interest in the death of her fetus is
specially protected under Casey.
as a form of heightened scrutiny both because the Court has employed it for individual
interests the Court plainly regards as particularly weighty, and because it places a heavier burden of justification on the state than rational basis review. Under the latter, the
state need only show that its interest is legitimate, not that its interest outweighs the
competing individual interest. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny,
54 UCLA L. RE;v. 1267, 1298-99 (2007) (discussing the Court's employment of interest
balancing, including in abortion cases).
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 858 (majority opinion); see also Fallon, supra note 28, at 1299
(discussing the intermediate scrutiny applied in Casey).
30. Id. at 876, 881 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 876-77.
32. Id. at 877 (explaining that no law imposing an undue burden "could be constitutional"). This is not to deny that balancing may play some role in undue burden analysis.
In particular, a court's judgment about what counts as a "substantial obstacle" may reflect
a comparison of the burden on women with the extent to which the state regulation in fact
advances the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetuses. See Khiara M. Bridges, "Life"
in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285,
1317-18 (2013). The federal courts of appeals are currently divided on this issue. Compare, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Lahey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir.) vacated in part,
135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (in applying the undue-burden test "we do not balance the wisdom or
effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law imposes"), with Planned Parenthood
Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912-13 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014)
("The more substantial the burden, the stronger the state's justification for the law must
be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger the state's justification, the
greater the burden may be before it becomes "undue."').
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Before turning to this question, it is useful to take a closer look
at the nature of this interest. Some women may choose abortion
solely to avoid the considerable physical and emotional burdens of
pregnancy and childbirth. 3'1 More often, however, ·the phrase "unwanted pregnancy" is a euphemism for "unwanted child"-that is,
a child the woman is unwilling (or unable) to nurture and raise
after it is born. 31 Legally speaking, every state allows the woman
to escape child-rearing by renouncing her parental rights, in
which event the child will be cared for by adoptive or foster parents.35 Yet experience shows that many women find it exceedingly
difficult to relinquish their newborn children, even when those
36
children were (and perhaps still are) unwanted. When Roe was
decided, only 20% of single mothers put their children up for
37
adoption-and that percentage has declined since then. As Professor Reva Siegel points out,
A woman is likely to form emotional bonds with a child during pregnancy; she is likely to believe that she has moral obligations to a
born child that are far greater than any she might have to an embryo/fetus; and she is likely to experience intense familial and social
38
pressure to raise a child she has borne.

When women do relinquish their infants, they frequently grieve
for years over their separation from them. 39

33. See Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortion: Quantitative
and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPIWDUCTIVE HEALTH 110, 113
~able 2 (2005), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.pdf (indicatmg that some women choose abortions for reasons such as, "[I] don't want people to know I
had sex or got pregnant" and "Physical problems with my health").
34. Id. (showing that reasons such as "Having a baby would dramatically change my
l'f"
1
' afford a baby right now," are
' significant factors in many decisions to have
e ~n d "C ant
abort10ns).
35. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Ls
It an. Of.lion for Lesbian .and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 389
(1996) ( Every state provides some irrevocable mechanism for both biological parents to
relinquish their legal status.").
36. ~ee CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, IMPACT OF ADOPTION
ON Bmnr PARENTS 2-3 (2013), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/f_im
pact.pdf.
. 3?. Jack. Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions: Advocating a Quantitative
L:mit on Private Agency Adoption Fees, 8 SEATTLE J. Soc. ,JUSTICE 729, 732 (2010) ("In
1973, twenty percent of unwed mothers placed their children up for adoption; by 1982, this
rate dropped to twelve percent."). Evon if, as seems likely, a significant subset of unwed
mothers may have wanted to become pregnant, the generalization in text would still be
warranted.
38. Siegel, supra note 21 at 372.
39. See CHILD WELFAHE INI<'O. GATEWAY, supra note 36, at 2-3.

2015]

RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION

1019

~t

seems fair to infer that many women view the emotional,
reputational, and relational burdens involved in relinquishing an
unwanted child as even greater than the expected burdens of
40
raising it. What is more, the available data concerning the reasons why women have abortions suggest that avoiding the postnatal burdens of raising or relinquishing an unwanted child is decisive far more often than avoiding pregnancy and childbirth. 41
Only a small minority of women list avoiding pregnancy and
42
childbirth among their reasons for electing abortion, while the
most frequently cited reasons are disruption of life plans, econom4
ic difficulties, and problematic relations with the father. a
Thus, the woman who is pregnant with an unwanted child
finds herself in this situation: the very fact that she does not
want the child makes the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth
harder to bear, and once she gives birth she must accept either
the burdens of raising her newborn child, or those of relinquishing it. 14 An elective abortion will enable her to avoid pregnancy
and childbirth (by terminating her pregnancy), and to avoid the
raise-or-relinquish dilemma (by ensuring that her pre-viable fetus does not survive). Consequently, a law that prohibits elective
abortions will frustrate both of these interests.
By contrast, a fetal-rescue program burdens only the latter interest, and burdens it in a different way. It puts the woman in
what we might call the gestate-or-relinquish dilemma: carry the
fetus to term or relinquish it to the state prior to viability for attempted rescue via AW. The gestate-or-relinquish dilemma can
best be characterized as a pre-viability, prenatal version of the
40. A variety of factors may explain why this is so. For example, a woman might discount the costs of child-rearing because they are spread out over the child's adolescence;
might anticipate that she will adapt to the burdens of childrearing because she will come
to love the child; or might anticipate that she will experience lasting sorrow because her
child will be raised by others.
41. See Finer et al., supra note 33 at 113, tbl.2.
42. The Alan Guttmacher Institute's surveys on the reasons women have abortions, as
contained in the research journal Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, do not
even list "avoiding the physical discomforts of pregnancy and childbirth" as a reason.
About 12% of women listed "physical problem with my health" as one of their reasons for
having an abortion, and it seems likely that some of those women were generally healthy
but concerned about the physical burdens of pregnancy. See id.
43. See id. According to the survey, "Having a baby would dramatically change my
life" was the most frequently cited reason for electing abortion (74%). The reasons, "Can't
afford a baby now," and "Don't want to be a single mother or having relationship problems," were the next most common (48%). Id.
44. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1582.
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raise-or-relinquish dilemma. Like its postnatal analogue, it frustrates the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus. If
she opts not to carry the fetus to term, she must reli_nquish ~t to
the state, and if AW succeeds, her biological child will be raised
-by others.
·
As Part III explains, the burden of relinquishing one's previable fetus is likely to be considerably less weighty than the burden of relinquishing one's newborn child. Nevertheless, in both
cases the woman's basic interest is the same-ensuring that her
fetus does not survive to become a child she will have relinquished. Consequently, if the woman has a specially protected
liberty interest in avoiding the raise-or-relinquish dilemma, we
can be confident that she also has a specially protected liberty interest in avoiding the gestate-or-relinquish dilemma triggered by
fetal-rescue programs.
If Roe and Casey focused exclusively on the woman's interest in
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, one could infer
that her specially protected liberty interest in an elective abortion
does not include ensuring the death of the fetus. Instead, however, Roe treats the burdens of child-raising (and by implication,
those of child-relinquishing) as an important part of the case for
recognizing that the woman's liberty to choose to terminate her
15
pregnancy is encompassed by the "right of privacy." An unwanted pregnancy, the Court said, "may force upon the woman a distressful life and future," in which her "health may be taxed by
child care"; she may experience "the distress ... associated with
the unwanted child"; she may have to wrestle with "the problem
of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it"; and she may also experience "the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood."w And while Casey's account of the woman's liberty begins
by emphasizing the "anxieties," "physical constraints," and "pain"
of pregnancy and childbirth, it culminates with the claim that
"[h]er suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to in-

45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Although the Court made no specific mention of the raise-or-relinquish dilemma, its allusion to "the distress" associated with the
unwanted child may be a veiled reference to it. See id. In any event, Roe's description of
the burdens of giving birth to an unwanted child, which assumes that raising the child is
the norm, leaves no doubt that the Court did not view adoption as an "easy way out" for
pregnant women. See id.
46. Id.
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sist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history
·and our culture." 17 The "vision of the woman's role" to which the
18
Court refers is obviously her role as mother-and in our history
and culture that includes child-rearing as well as child-bearing.
Similarly, if Casey had relied solely on a bodily autonomy rationale for the woman's liberty interest in elective abortion, 19 we
could infer that ensuring the death of the fetus is not protected.
Bodily autonomy cannot ground a right to destroy the fetus because it is not part of the woman's body, and because removing
the fetus from her body will restore the woman to her prepregnant condition whether or not the fetus survives. 50 The Casey
Court, however, also endorsed a reproductive liberty rationale,
arguing that Roe stands in the line of cases specially protecting
the liberty to decide "whether or not to beget or bear a child," 51
and asserting that "in some critical respects the abortion decision
is of the same character as the decision to use contraception." 52
Lest one think the common ground between abortion and contraception is solely that both enable a woman to avoid pregnancy
and childbirth, Casey highlights the plight of a woman who believes that "the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the
infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent." 53
Although Casey does not spell out how the right to an elective
abortion enables this woman to avoid bringing a child she is unable to care for into the world, there can be only one answer: by
ensuring that her fetus does not survive the abortion. Casey's
reasoning thus implies that the woman's liberty interest in not

47. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (majority opinion).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 857 (stating that Roe may be seen as grounded in "personal autonomy
and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection").
50. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: 'The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437, 486-87 (1990) (arguing that the woman's right to elective abortion, understood as "a right of bodily integrity or freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions or burdens," is a right "to terminate the pregnancy ... not a right to destroy the embryo/fetus if
her bodily integrity may otherwise be protected").
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (majority opinion).
52. Id. at 852; see also id. at 884 (plurality opinion) (referring to "the two more general
rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and
the right to physical autonomy").
53. Id. at 853 (majority opinion).
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reproducing is protected by the right to elective abortion as well
51
as by the right to use contraception.
·II. UNDER CASEY, THE WOMAN'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THE
DEATH OF THE FETUS SHOULD TRIGGER AN INTEREST-BALANCING
ANALYSIS, NOT STRICT SCRU'l'INY OR THE UNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD

That the woman's liberty interest in ensuring the death of her
fetus is protected by the right to elective abortion does not mean
that she has a specific right to insist on the death of her previable fetus and hence that fetal-rescue programs are unconstitutional.55 This part argues that, under Casey, whether such a right
exists should be determined by balancing the woman's interest in
ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus against the state's interest in protecting its life, and not by application of the undue
burden standard.
Interest balancing underlies the right to elective abortion as
redefined in Casey. 56 In place of Roe's holding that there is a fun57
damental right to elective abortion until viability, Casey holds
that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests are not strong enough
to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure."58 Casey thereby grounds the right to elective abortion in a
54. Id. at 852; see id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Were Roe's strict scrutiny controlling, fetal-rescue programs would plainly be unconstitutional: they interfere with the woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy as she and her doctor think best (using a fetus-killing method), thereby frustrating
one of the woman's protected interests (ensuring the death of the fetus)-and they do so to
advance what Roe held to be the state's less-than-compelling, and therefore inadequate,
interest in pre-viable fetuses. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162, 163 (1973).
56. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73 (plurality opinion).
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973) (noting that the woman's liberty to
choose an abortion constitutes a "fundamental rightD" that may be infringed only by laws
that are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest).
?8: Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion); see id. at 869-71 (plurality opinion) (explammg that, after viability, "the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted"); see also id. at 954
(Relmquist, C .•J., dissenting) (noting that the joint opinion rejects the view that there is a
fundamental right to elective abortion that can be overcome only by a compelling state interest); Richard H. Fallon, ,Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1299
(~007) ("Whereas Roe v. Wade held that infringements on the fundamental right to abortion could be upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,
Pla_nned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey substituted a formula under
which courts now assess whether abortion regulations place an 'undue burden' on a worn·
an's right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.") (citations omitted).
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new analytical foundation: a direct interest-balancing judgment
that the woman's overall interest in having an abortion outweighs the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life. 59 This
interest-balancing judgment does not tell us whether the woman's
interest in ensuring the death of the fetus, standing alone, outweighs the state's interest in protecting fetal life. 60 Under Casey,
this is a question of first impression that should be decided by the
same sort of direct interest balancing the plurality opinion relied
on in reaffirming Roe's central holding. 61
In addition to interest balancing, however, Casey also adopted
the undue burden standard to evaluate regulations that, while
not prohibiting elective abortions, interfere with women's access
to them to some extent. 62 Because fetal-rescue programs seem to
fit that description, it could be argued that their constitutionality
should be determined by applying the undue burden standard rather than by interest balancing. This issue is especially important, because there is a good chance that fetal-rescue programs would fail the undue burden standard. 63

59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also id. at 861 (describing viability as "the point at
which the balance of interests tips").
60. A parallel question would be presented by a state law that burdened the woman's
interest in avoiding pregnancy and childbirth, but not her interest in ensuring the death of
the fetus. But any state law that satisfied this description would fail to advance the state's
interest in protecting fetal life, and consequently would be unconstitutional under an interest-balancing approach.
61. See, e.g., id. at 871 (plurality opinion); see Cruzan v Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 279 (1990) ("Determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process
Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been
violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests."') (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
62. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
63. A regulation imposes an undue burden if its "purpose or effect" is to create a substantial obstacle to women seeking elective abortions. Id. at 877. The state's willingness to
pay the heavy costs of AW gives rise to a compelling inference that the "purpose" of fetalrescue programs is to save aborted fetuses, not to prevent women from obtaining abortions. Nevertheless, fetal-rescue programs might run afoul of the undue burden test's "effects" prong. The inquiry would focus on women who would much rather have a nowforbidden fetus-killing abortion than a fetus-sparing abortion followed by attempted rescue of their fetus via an artificial womb. See id. at 894 (majority opinion) ("The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group
for whom the law is irrelevant."). While some of these women would reluctantly opt for
fetus-sparing abortions, others would seek out illegal fetus-killing abortions (or travel to
states where they are legal), and a third group would be deterred from terminating their
pregnancies tout court. Depending in part on how widespread these effects were thought to
be, they might either be deemed "incidental" or seen as imposing an undue burden on
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Once we consider the intended function of the undue burden
standard, however, the case for using it collapses. The :indue
burden test strikes a balance between the woman~s overall liberty
interest in an elective abortion and the state's interest in protect61
ing fetal life by regulating (but not prohibiting) abortions. As
Casey explains, the undue burden test's domain consists of abortion regulations that "mak[e] it more difficult or more expensive
to procure an abortion," 65 thereby burdening both the woman's interest in avoiding pregnancy and childbirth and her interest in
ensuring the death of the fetus. Regulations such as those at issue in Casey, which impose requirements that must be met before
a woman can terminate her pregnancy, fall squarely within this
description. 6G So would a statute that burdened the woman's liberty to terminate her pregnancy by requiring her to pay the high
costs of AW. Fetal-rescue programs, by contrast, do not make it
more difficult or more expensive for the woman to terminate her
pregnancy. They burden only her interest in ensuring that her fetus does not survive the termination of her pregnancy, and consequently should not be subject to the undue burden test.
This analysis is confirmed by the anomalous results that might
ensue if the Court evaluated fetal-rescue programs using the undue burden standard rather than by balancing the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus against the state's interest in protecting its life. Were the Court to conclude that fetalrescue programs impose an undue burden on women's access to
elective abortions, it would be creating a new right to ensure the
death of rescuable fetuses without ever having balanced the interests that Casey's own methodology indicates should determine
whether such a right exists. 67 This cannot be right. Only by examining whether the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fewome~'s access to elective abortions. See id. at 874 (plurality opinion). Although the outcome is necessarily speculative in the absence of experience with AW technologies, there is
clearly a realistic possibility that fetal-rescue programs would fail the undue burden test.
. 64. See id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconcilmg the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."); see also
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2000) ("Casey, in short, struck a balance. The balance was
central to its holding.")
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion).
6~. See id. at 895 (majority opinion) (holding that Pennsylvania's spousal notification
reqmrement posed an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, as it "[would] operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion" and was therefore invalid).
'
67. See id. at 871 (plurality opinion) (discussing the Court's interest-balancing methodology).
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tus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring its death can we
determine whether fetal-rescue programs are constitutional under Casey.

III. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN RESCUING THE PRE-VIABLE FETUS
OUTWEIGHS THE WOMAN'S INTEREST IN ENSURING ITS DEA'l'H

The argument so far can be summarized as follows: under Casey, the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus is
within the liberty specially protected by the right to elective abortion; accordingly, fetal-rescue programs should be evaluated using the interest-balancing approach Casey itself used in reaffirming Roe's central holding. In conducting this analysis, I will
assume that the woman's overall interest in an elective abortion
outweighs the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetusand thus that the right to elective abortion is, on Casey's premises, sound on the merits as well as supported by stare decisis. 68 On
that assumption, this part (1) provides thorough descriptionsand assessments-of the woman's interest in ensuring the death
of the fetus and the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal
life; (2) analyzes and applies Casey's implications for the relative

68. In a companion article, I present a different (but related) interest-balancing argument that, if correct, would establish the constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs.
Stephen G. Gilles, Why the Right to Elective Abortion Fails Casey's Own Interest·
Balancing Methodology-and Why It Matters, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. _ (forthcoming).
The thrust of that argument is that, setting aside stare decisis, the right to elective abor·
tion fails the interest-balancing analysis that, under Casey, would be necessary to justify
that right as an original matter. See id. at_, _. The judgments of a majority of the Jus·
tices in Casey, a careful comparison of the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life with the
woman's interest in an elective abortion, and the traditional protections Anglo-American
law accorded to fetuses, all support the judgment that the state's interest outweighs the
woman's even in the earliest stages of pregnancy. Consequently, even if (as Casey holds)
the right to elective abortion should be preserved by virtue of stare decisis, 505 U.S. at
860-61, legislation such as fetal-rescue programs should be evaluated on the understanding that the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in an elective abortion. If the argument is correct, the constitutionality of fetalrescue programs follows a fortiori. Given that the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus
outweighs the woman's overall interest in an elective abortion, which includes both avoiding pregnancy and ensuring the death of the fetus, it must also outweigh the interest with
which a fetal-rescue program interferes-her stand-alone interest in ensuring the death of
the fetus.
Although I continue to think that the argument just summarized is cogent, there is no
need to repeat it in full here. For even if that argument is wrong, the interest-balancing
analysis this article presents suffices to show that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal
life outweighs the woman's interest in the death of the fetus. (Some duplication, however,
is unavoidable: in particular, Parts III.B-III.D of this article draw heavily on the com pan·
ion article's interest-balancing case against the right to elective abortion).
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strength of those interests; and (3) presents _arguments bearing
on which interest is stronger as a matter of "reasoned judgment."69
The ultimate question we are addressing is whether the woman's interest in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus outweighs the state's interest in rescuing it via AW. Some of the arguments I will be presenting address this interest-balancing
question directly. In addition, however, two other interestanalysis questions are especially relevant. As Part III.A argues,
the woman's interest in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus
is much weaker than her overall interest in an elective abortion.
But this means that the state's interest in protecting the previable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring its death
unless that state interest is also much weaker than her overall interest in an elective abortion. Part 111.C argues that this condition
is not satisfied: the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus is almost as great as (if not greater than) the woman's interest in an elective abortion.
Moreover, we know that the state's interest in protecting the
viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in an elective abortion (which is why the right to elective abortion ends at viability).10 Given ·Part Ill.A's conclusion that the woman's interest in
ensuring the death of the fetus is much less weighty than her
overall interest in an elective abortion, it follows that the state's
interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus prevails unless that interest is much less weighty than the state's interest in the viable fetus. Part 111.D will argue that this condition is not satisfied: the
state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus is almost as
great as its interest in protecting the viable fetus.
A The Woman's Interest in Ensuring That Her Pre-Viable Fetus
Does Not Survive Is Substantially Weaker Than Her Overall
Interest in an Elective Abortion

Under Casey, the right to an elective abortion rests on an interest-balancing judgment that the woman's interests in having
69. Because our legal tradition has never been faced with a situation in which the
woi:ian's interest in ensuring the death of a pre-viable, but rescuable, fetus is pitted
ag~mst the _state's interest in protecting and rescuing it via AW, this article does not examme the history of abortion regulation in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
70. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion).
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an abortion outweigh the state's interest in protecting pre-viable
11
fetal life. Fetal-rescue programs are not governed by this judgment, because the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the
fetus is, for two reasons, substantially weaker than her combined
interests in having an elective abortion.
First, unlike prohibitions on abortion, fetal-rescue programs
permit the woman to terminate her pregnancy, thereby avoiding
the serious and invasive burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. A
partial enumeration of the common physical burdens would include faintness, nausea and vomiting, tiredness, insomnia, shortness of breath, tender breasts, constipation, frequent need to urinate, backache, edema of the feet and ankles, foot and leg cramps,
varicose veins, hemorrhoids, mastitis, dry skin, irritability, depression, loss of sexual desire, weight gain, the often severe pain
of labor if delivery is vaginal, and the risks, pain, and scarring of
a C-section if it is not. 12 As Donald Regan writes, "The ills of
pregnancy, delivery, and beyond make an impressive list .... [l]t
is an unusually lucky woman who does not put up with enough
pain, discomfort and disruption of appearance and emotional
state to add up to a major burden." 73 As he also points out, these
"pains and discomforts ... are likely to be significantly aggravat11
ed when the entire pregnancy is unwanted." The imposition of
these physical and mental burdens on unwilling women has always been a linchpin of the case against laws that prohibit elective abortions. Unlike such prohibitions, fetal-rescue programs allow the woman to avoid these burdens by terminating her
pregnancy whenever she chooses.
Second, whereas prohibitions on abortion force the woman to
choose between raising or relinquishing a child to which she has
given birth, fetal-rescue programs force her to choose between
raising or relinquishing a pre-viable fetus. The latter dilemma is
less burdensome because the woman's emotional bond with an
unwanted fetus will normally be much weaker than the bond she
would likely experience with her newborn child. 75 During the se71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion).
72. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1579-81.
73. Id. at 1582.
74. Id.
75. See generally Carl M. Corter & Alison S. Fleming, Psychobiology of Maternal Behavior in Human Beings, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 93 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 1995)
(explaining that maternal behavior and psychological attachment develop gradually
throughout the duration of a pregnancy).
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cond half of pregnancy, many women experience incre~sed ~a
.ternal feelings toward the fetus. 76 Often, those feelings mtens1fy
dramatically after the woman has given birth. Indeed, rou~hly
half of the women who have decided on adoption before birth
77
change their minds after birth.
The likelihood and extent of harm to the woman's relationships
and reputation should also be much smaller when she relinquishes her pre-viable fetus than when she relinquishes her newborn
child. To begin with, it will surely be far easier, should she wish
to do so, for a woman to conceal from the father or her family that
she has had a pre-viability abortion and relinquished her fetus
than that she has given birth and relinquished her child. Furthermore, in many families and communities there are strong social expectations that the woman who carries a pregnancy to term
will raise her child. There are no parallel expectations about the
woman who decides to have a pre-viability abortion, and no reason to expect such expectations to emerge in the wake of fetalrescue programs. And whereas the child's father and other relatives may form bonds of their own with the woman's newborn
child-bonds that would often be disrupted if she relinquishes the
child-that is less likely to have happened early in pregnancy,
even if the woman has told the father and other relatives she is
pregnant.
Yet even if relinquishing a first- or second-trimester fetus will
typically be much less psychologically taxing than relinquishing a
newborn infant, it seems inevitable that many women will experience it as deeply distressing. Some women become attached to
their fetuses as soon as they learn they are pregnant, and this
78
can occur even when the pregnancy is unwanted. Quite apart
76. Studies have confirmed that women often experience increased maternal feelings
toward the fetus from about the twentieth week of gestation onwards. See id. That is surely one reason why the vast majority of second-trimester abortions occur prior to the twentieth week. See Lilo T. Strauss et al., Abortion Surveillance-United States, 2003, 55
MormIDITY & MoR'rALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 4 (2006).
77. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents to
the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 539 (2005). As one court observed, "Experience has evidenced a host of cases in which a mother plans to give her unborn child to adoptive parents, only to change her mind after going through child-birth
and the resulting mother-child attachment." In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1193
(Wyo. 1986).
78. Some research suggests that women who suffer early miscarriages are as distressed when the pregnancy is unwanted as when it is wanted. See Jack P. Carter, PrePersonality Pregnancy Losses: Stillbirths, Miscarriages, and Abortions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
DEATH AND DYING 267 (2003).
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from attachment, some women will be strongly averse to the prospect that someone else will rear their child. Others may fear that
third parties, or the resulting child, will attribute parental responsibility to them in the short or long run. 79 For all these women, fetus relinquishment may result in heavy and long-lasting
psychological and emotional burdens.
In sum, although the woman's interest in ensuring the death of
the pre-viable fetus is substantial and lies within the specially
protected realm of intimate decisions about the family and reproduction, it is also much less weighty than her overall interests in
having an elective abortion, which include avoiding both unwanted pregnancy and childbirth and the more burdensome postnatal
version of the raise-or-relinquish dilemma. The question of how
much less weighty obviously cannot be determined with anything
resembling exactitude. 80 But if the woman's overall interests in
having an elective abortion are given a total weight of 100, it
would be difficult to defend giving her interest in ensuring the
death of the pre-viable fetus an average weight of 90-or of 10. In
the context of avoiding postnatal relinquishment, a weight of 60
or even 70 might be defensible. In the context of avoiding the
raise-or-relinquish dilemma early in pregnancy, to go much more
above half that weight range would devalue the difference in
traumatic intensity between relinquishing a pre-viable fetus and

7B. Writing in the context of disputes over IVF embryos, Glenn Cohen has argued that
the putative "right not to be a parent" can usefully be understood as a "bundle" that includes three distinct possible rights-"a right not to be a gestational parent, a right not to
be a genetic parent, and a right not to be a legal parent." I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen,
Rights Not to Procreate]. As Cohen points out, however, this categorization
does not exhaust the category of types of parenthood, in that there is a residual social category of parenthood-what I call "attributional parenthood"that remains .... [T]he law fails as a mechanism for allocating this kind of
parenthood or, perhaps more accurately, it fails at unbundling this kind of
parenthood from genetic parenthood.
I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be A Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1135-36
(2008) [hereinafter, Cohen, Right Not to Be A Genetic Parent]. Cohen's insight is that society, the resulting child, or the parent herself (or himself) may assign general parental status and responsibility for the child to a genetic parent, even if that person is not the child's
gestational or legal parent. Id. at 1136-37. These attributions of parental responsibility, in
turn, may be a source of emotional distress and reputational harm to the unwilling genetic
parent. Id. at 1142-43.
80. The numerical weights in this and the other examples in this part are meant as
illustrations that help bring the critical factors for interest balancing into clearer focus,
and are not intended to suggest that those interests can be quantified or that the weights
in the examples are the "best" ones. I have, however, attempted to assign weights that fall
within the range of intuitive plausibility.
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relinquishing a newborn child. I will accordingly use 40 (out of
100) as an upper-bound estimate of the average weight to be given to the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the pre-viable
81
fetus in the context of fetal-rescue programs.
We are now in a position to do a preliminary analysis of the
constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs. The state interest a fetal-rescue program advances-protecting the life of the pre-viable
fetus-is the same state interest that would be advanced by a law
prohibiting elective abortions. But whereas a ban on elective
abortions frustrates the woman's combined interests in avoiding
pregnancy and the postnatal raise-or-relinquish dilemma, a fetalrescue program frustrates only her much less weighty interest in
not relinquishing her pre-viable fetus. This implies that fetalrescue programs are constitutional unless the woman's interests
in an elective abortion greatly outweigh the state's interest in
protecting pre-viable fetuses. For example, if the woman's overall
interests in an elective abortion are again assigned a weight of
100, and her interest in not relinquishing her pre-viable fetus is
assigned a weight of 40, fetal-rescue programs are constitutional
unless the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetuses is assigned a weight below 40.
Moreover, under Roe and Casey, the state's interest in protecting the life of the viable fetus outweighs the woman's combined
interests in an elective abortion. 82 Therefore, unless the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus (beginning at conception)
is much less weighty than its interest in protecting the viable fetus, the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus must outweigh the
woman's interest in ensuring its death. If the state's interest in
the viable fetus is assigned a weight of 110 as against the woman's overall interest of 100 in an elective abortion the state's in'
terest in the pre-viable fetus prevails against the woman's
isolated interest (40) even if it carries only half the weight it would
have at viability (55).
We have, then, three interest-analysis inquiries that can help
to determine whether or not fetal-rescue programs are constitu-

81.

For purposes of constitutional interest balancing, I assume that each interest is

measure~ according to its average weight across the spectrum of women facing unwanted

pregnancies.
. 82. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opinum); Hoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
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tional under Casey. First, does the woman's interest in ensuring
that her pre-viable fetus dies when her pregnancy is terminated
outweigh the state's interest in rescuing it via AW? Second, do
the woman's overall interests in an elective abortion greatly outweigh the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus? (Put
differently, does the interest-balancing judgment that underlies
the right to elective abortion present a close and difficult question, or do the woman's interests easily and clearly prevail?)
Third, is the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life much less
weighty than its interest in viable fetal life? In turning next to
how Roe and Casey characterize the state's interest in protecting
the pre-viable fetus, I will refer when appropriate to each of these
questions. Our ultimate interest, of course, lies in answering the
first question. But, because Roe and Casey deal with the woman's
overall interest in an elective abortion, rather than with her isolated interest in ensuring that her pre-viable fetus does not survive abortion, those decisions have more immediate implications
for the second and third inquiries.

B. Under Casey, the State Has a ''Profound" Interest in Protecting
the Pre- Viable Fetus
In describing the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life, it is
best to begin with Roe. The Roe Court rejected-as widely con83
tested and inherently unprovable -Texas' claim that the state
has an overriding interest in "protecting prenatal life .... on the
theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception."8·1 Yet Roe accepted the state's "less rigid claim that as
long as at least potential life is involved" it can invoke a legiti85
mate interest in protecting the fetus. In describing the fetus as
"potential life," the Roe Court did not suggest-nor could it
have-that there is any serious debate about whether a fetus is a
living organism, about whether that organism is biologically human (that is, belongs to the species Homo sapiens), or about
whether it is genetically distinct from its parents. 86 Instead, the

83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (invoking the lack of consensus on when normatively
human life begins among "those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology").
84. Id. at 150, 153.
85. Id. at 150.
86. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) ("[B]y common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is
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Roe Court's evident meaning was that the fetus is not yet a "new
human life" 87-that is, a normatively human being.
Roe's terminology confirms this analysis:. the opinion interchangeably employs the terms "potential life," 88 "potential hum~n
life," 89 and "the potentiality of life," 90 and uses them in contra~1s
tinction to the terms "new human life," 91 "life, as we recogmze
it," 92 and "persons in the whole sense." 93 "Potential human life" is
thus shorthand for what one might call "new life that will natu91
rally become a normatively human being if allowed to develop."
Although Roe holds that the state's interest in protecting "potential human life" is not compelling prior to viability, it also concedes that this state interest is "legitimate and important" as
soon as conception is complete. 95 Roe thus permits the state to
adopt in law the theory that "potential human life" begins at conception, and to assert an important interest in protecting each feviable outside the womb.").
87. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 154.
89. Id. at 159.
90. Id. at 162.
91. Id. at 150.
92. Id. at 161.
93. Id. at 162.
94. .Jed Rubenfeld argues that Roe means something very different by "potential life":
that the fetus is to be "considered solely as a 'potential' person," and not as a living entity
in itself. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991). Thus, according to Rubenfeld, "[t]o understand the fetus as a 'potential life' is not to understand it as an actual, but less than human, animal." Id. at 609. I have argued elsewhere that "Rubenfeld misunderstands both
the relevant facts about human development and the construction the Roe Court put on
those facts." See Gilles, supra note 68, at _, n._. For present purposes, it suffices to address the latter point. Rubenfeld ignores Roe's recognition that abortion differs qualitatively from contraception because the pregnant woman "carries an embryo and, later, a
fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus,"
and that, as a result, "[t]he woman's privacy is no longer sole." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. This
entity-the fetus-is the entity Roe refers to in the same paragraph as "potential human
life." Id. Clearly, Roe views the fetus as a "second biological life," but a life that is not yet
human-in other words, "an actual, but less than human, animal." Gilles, supra note 68,
at_, n._; Rubenfeld, supra at 609. And so does Casey. See Gilles, supra note 68, at_,
n._.

95. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (acknowledging that abortion is "inherently different"
from contraception because the woman "carries an embryo, and later, a fetus," and holding
that the state can reasonably "decide that at some point in time" its interest in "potential
human life, becomes significantly involved"). Casey likewise describes Roe's "scope" as encompassing all "postconception potential life." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 859 (majority opinion); see also Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 848 (2007) (describing Roe as holding that "[a]lthough embryos and fetuses are not constitutional persons, states have legitimate and important interests in their development and potential for personhood").
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tus, understood as a new life whose nature is to become human if
the pregnancy is not aborted.

In limiting the right to elective abortion to pre-viable fetuses,
the Roe Court asserted that the state's interest "grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term," 96 and becomes compelling at viability, because the fetus has then acquired "the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 97 By the
time the fetus has developed enough to be viable, there is no
longer widespread disagreement about whether it is normatively
human: the resemblance between the fetus's capabilities and
those of a newborn child is sufficiently strong-and sufficiently
widely acknowledged to be strong-to warrant recognition of a
98
compelling state interest should the state elect to assert it. Under Roe, then, both the fetus's potential to become a normatively
human being and its already-developed capabilities-which vary
greatly depending on its stage of development-weigh in the constitutional balance. 99 Even in its first stages of development, the
fetus's innate potential to become normatively human gives the
state an important interest in protecting its life; at viability, the
capabilities that enable the fetus to survive outside the womb, together with its continuing potential, 100 make the state's interest

96. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
97. Id. at 163.
98. See Nancy Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE
L.J. 639, 643 (1986) (arguing that Roe implicitly adopted "the assumption that a viable
fetus was one that was substantially developed and had reached 'late' gestation, and the
ethical precept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective abortion can be
forbidden"). As Rhoden suggests, the "dichotomy between late and early abortion ... is
perhaps the closest this society has come to a consensus about the morality of abortion."
Id. at 669. By the time the fetus is developmentally viable, the great majority of Americans would view it as "new human life." See id. As I argue elsewhere, see Gilles, supra note
13, the developmental viability line dovetails with Roe's argument that the absence of consensus about when normatively human life begins precludes recognition of a compelling
state interest in fetal life throughout pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62.
99. 'l'his perspective is not unique to Roe. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWAL'l', RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 131-32 (1988) (suggesting that "the intuitive moral
sense of most people in our culture is that both potential capacity and present or past
characteristics matter").
100. One might surmise that the fetus's "potential" to become normatively human is
exhausted at viability, because it can then be deemed to be 'actual human life.' But if we
ask what caused the fetus to develop to the stage at which it is viable, the superficiality of
this reasoning becomes evident. Over a period of roughly twenty-three weeks, the viable
fetus develops from a zygote to a fetus weighing roughly a pound because its own natureincluding its innate genetic endowment-directed its development. And this natural genetic endowment will continue to drive the development of the viable fetus, before and after birth, until it becomes a mature human being.
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weighty enough to override the woman's right to an elective abortion.
Like Roe, Casey recognizes that the state could claim an overriding interest in protecting fetal life if it could demonstrate that
normatively human life begins at conception. 101 Also like Roe, Casey denies that any such demonstration is possible. 102 On the other hand, both Casey and Roe acknowledge that the truth of the
proposition that "potential human life" begins at conception is
sufficiently clear that the state can assert a legitimate and important interest in protecting that life. 103 Under Casey, that is the
premise on which interest balancing must be conducted: the previable fetus is not a normatively human being, but the state may
recognize it as "potential" human life, and may claim an important interest in protecting it as such. 104
Yet although the five Justices in the Casey majority reaffirmed
that the state has a "legitimate interestD from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus that may become
a child," 105 their coalition fractured when it came to the character
of this interest and the weight to be accorded it. The controlling
Casey plurality argued that Roe's recognition of the state's "important and legitimate interest" in fetal life was "given too little
acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases," and elected to "rely upon Roe, as against the later
106
cases." The plurality proceeded to reject Roe's trimester framework, holding that "in practice it undervalues the State's interest
in the potential life within the woman," and replacing it with the
107
undue-burden test. And whereas Roe treated the state's interest
as (at most) "important,'' 108 the Casey plurality described it as
109
"profound." In short, the plurality opinion held that the state
may assert a more weighty interest in the pre-viable fetus on the
~O~. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality
opm10n).
102.

~ee id .. at 850 (asserting that reasonable persons can disagree about when new

~uman life b.e~1~s, and that the state cannot by law "resolve th[is] philosophic questionO
1~ such a defm1tive way th~t ~woman lacks all choice in the matter"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 159
( We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.").
103. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 875-76.
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
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same theory Roe permitted-that new life whose nature is to become normatively human is present when conception is complete
(or at such time thereafter as the state specifies). 1w tlustices
Blackmun and Stevens would have given much less weight to the
state's interest than the plurality; 111 but because the four dissenting Justices would have given the state's interest even greater
weight than the plurality, the plurality's position constitutes Casey's holding on this issue. 112
C. Under Casey, the Woman's Interest in an Elective Abortion At
Most Slightly Outweighs the State's Interest in the Pre- Viable
Fetus
As we have just seen, the controlling Casey plurality opinion
confirms that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life is grounded in an understanding that the fetus is new life that is becoming
human and that has an interest in its own future development,
thereby affirming that this state interest is profoundly weighty
throughout pregnancy. 113 Standing alone, this does not prove that
the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's
interest in ensuring its death-but it does lay the foundation for
that conclusion.
We have not yet considered, however, Casey's implications as to
the relative weights of the state's interest in protecting the pre .
viable fetus and the woman's overall interest in an elective abortion. The previous analysis established that, unless the woman's
overall interest is much weightier than the state's, her isolated in110. Id. at 871.
111. Justice Stevens argued that the state has only "an indirect interest" in "expanding
the population" and minimizing the "offense" to persons who believe abortion "reflects an
unacceptable disrespect for potential human life." Id. at 914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens' recasting of the state's interest completely removes the fetus from the
equation and leads inexorably to the conclusion that the woman's interest in an elective
abortion greatly outweighs the state's interest in protecting "potential life." See id. For his
part, J'ustice Blackmun claimed that prior to viability the fetus "cannot reasonably and
objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to,
those of the pregnant woman." Id. at 932-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Webster
v. Reprod. Heath Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Justice
Blackmun's formulation treats the fetus as if it were merely part of the woman's body until viability, when it abruptly becomes an individual rights-bearer. See id. 'l'he Casey plurality disagreed, acknowledging that even before viability the fetus is a "second life" that
can be "the object of state protection," so long as that protection does not "overrideU" the
woman's rights. Id. at 870.
112. See id. at 966, 979; see also infra note 123.
113. See id. at 876 (plurality opinion).
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terest in ensuring that her pre-viable fetus does not ~urvive ~he
abortion must be outweighed by the state's interest m rescumg
the fetus. As I will now argue, seven of the Justic~s in Casey w~re
clearly of the view that the woman's overall interest in an elective
abortion is not much greater than the state's interest in protect111
ing the pre-viable fetus.
Only six of the nine Justices who decided Casey explicitly stated their views about whether as an original matter, the woman's
'
' .
liberty interest in an elective abortion outweighs the states m115
terest in protecting the pre-viable fetus.
Unsurprisingly, .the
four dissenting Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas) argued that the state's interest ?u~
weighed the woman's. 116 Of the five Justices in the Casey ma3onty, only Justices Blackmun and Stevens defended the majority's
affirmation that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests
are not
117
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion" on the merits. Justices Blackmun and Stevens also joined portions of the
joint opinion co-authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
114. My interpretations of the Court's abortion decisions, and of Casey in particular,
are based on the opinions of the Court in those cases-which constitute the judge-made
constitutional law arising out of them-and on the dissenting and concurring opinions,
which stake out the official, public positions of the Justices who signed them. In turn, my
assessment of the views of the individual Justices in Casey is based on the opinions they
authored or joined. I have not relied on sources such as the papers of individual Justices,
which might shed revealing light on their motivations and deliberations, but cannot alter
the public meaning of their opinions.
115. 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion).
116. The dissenters' primary argument was that, contrary to the Court's usual substantive due process jurisprudence (and to any defensible understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause), Roe recognized an unenumerated fundamental right to
elective abortion despite the fact that "the longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed." Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at
952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[O]n this record, it can scarcely be said that any
deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the
classification of the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process Clause of the
Four~eenth Amendi:ient"). But the dissenters also argued that Roe was wrong even in its
own mterest-balancmg terms, because it simply assumed that "what the State is protecting is the mere 'potentiality of human life."' Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As the dissenters saw it, the Roe Court should have deferred to the state's reasonable judgment that
~he fetu~ is "a h~ma.n life" whose claim to protection from the state outweighs the woman's
mterest m termmatmg the pregnancy. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 846 (majority opinion); see id. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he Roe
f:amework, and the viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and
accommodating the State's interest in potential human life.") (quoting Webster v. Reprod.
Health ~erv~;· 49~ U.S'. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); id. at 912 (Stevens, J.,
concurrmg) (Roe is an mtegral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women.").
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Bout.er, thereby conferring majority-opinion status on those sections. But although the Casey majority opinion reaffirmed the
right to elective abortion, and characterized it as grounded in a
judgment that the woman's liberty interest outweighs the state's
interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life, the joint opinion specifically declined to endorse this judgment on the merits. Instead, it
explained that "the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication
of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of
stare decisis." 118 As that statement implies, one or more members
of the Casey majority had grave doubts about the soundness of
Roe's central holding, and voted to reaffirm it only after taking
into account "the force of stare decisis." 119
In Part IV of their opinion, which Justices Blackmun and Stevens refused to join, but which constitutes the controlling opinion
120
of the Court under the rule set out in Marks v. United States,
Casey's co-authors acknowledged that "the difficult question faced
in Roe" was "[t]he weight to be given th[e] state interest" in "protecting the potentiality of human life." 121 As we have already seen,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter went on to rule that Roe
and later cases undervalued the state's interest in protecting previable fetal life. 122 Their explanation of their "reservations" about
118. Id. at 853 (majority opinion).
119. Id.
120. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (ruling that when "no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds"') (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) Goint opinion)); see also Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (applying the rule in
Marhs to the plurality opinion in Casey). In the twenty-plus years since Casey was decided, all of the Justices who expressed an opinion in Casey have agreed that the joint opinion, including the portions joined only by three authors (the "plurality opinion"), as well as
those joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens (the "majority opinion"), constitutes the
Court's authoritative ruling. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 150, 156 (2007) (rejecting undue
burden challenges to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 by applying the Casey
plurality's undue burden standard); id. at 188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding an undue
burden on the relevant class of women by applying the Casey standard); Carhart I, 530
U.S. at 945-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding no undue burden under Casey); id. at 982
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding no undue burden under Casey's standard). Thus, subject
to the usual rules distinguishing dicta from holdings and their supporting rationales, the
entire joint opinion in Casey is binding law. This is because the three-Justice "plurality"
portions of that opinion allow more state regulation of abortion than Justices Blackmun
and Stevens would have allowed, but less regulation than the four dissenters would have
sanctioned.
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162
(1973)).
122. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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reaffirming Roe's central holding shows that, aft_er correcting for
that undervaluation each of them found it difficult to conclude
that the woman's in'terest in an elective abortion outweighs the
state's interest in pre-viable fetal life. No Justice who thought
that the woman's interest greatly outweighs the state's could experience any such difficulty.
To be sure, Casey's co-authors, invoking stare decisis, declined
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when
the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is
insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when
123
it is subject to certain exceptions.

But although their reticence may leave some doubt about whether Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter each believed that
124
Roe was wrongly decided as an original matter, their "reservations" undeniably establish that they did not believe Roe was
clearly correct as an original matter. Any uncertainty on this
point is eliminated by the Casey majority opinion's elaborate argument that Roe's central holding should have "rare precedential
force" because Roe "call[ed] the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution." 125 This argument would have
been utterly superfluous had Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter each believed that the woman's interest greatly outweighed the state's. Indeed, their declared objective-ensuring
that Roe's central holding remained settled law 126-would have
been far better served had they joined forces with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens and reaffirmed Roe's central holding on
the merits, while buttressing that holding with a "normal stare
decisis analysis." 127
To summarize, in Casey, a majority of five Justices reaffirmed
the right to elective abortion prior to viability on the basis of an
interest-balancing judgment that only two Justices were willing
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
124. See Gilles, supra note 68, at_ (arguing that the Casey joint opinion shows that at
least one of its authors believed Roe was wrongly decided as an original matter).
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
126. Id. at 844 (majority opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.").
127. Id. at 861 (plurality opinion). That is exactly what the Court had done in City of
Akron v. Allron Center for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 & n.1 (1983) (reaf·
firming Roe on stare decisis grounds); id. at 426-27 (reaffirming Roe on the merits).
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to endorse on the merits, that four Justices argued was erroneous
on the merits, and that the remaining three Justices believed was
either erroneous or, at best, a very close call. These views were
not mere dicta. The dissenters' conviction that Roe's central holding was erroneous, combined with the plurality's "reservations"
about the soundness of that holding, altered the structure and
reasoning of the majority opinion in Casey. Because only two Justices were prepared to affirm Roe's soundness on the merits, 128 the
Casey majority was forced to rely heavily on stare decisis and
"principles of institutional integrity." 129 For that reason, one
might argue that the plurality's reservations form part of Casey's
ratio decidendi, and are therefore entitled to stare decisis effect.
But even if not, the fact that seven of the Justices in Casey rejected the proposition that the woman's interest in an elective abortion greatly outweighs the state's interest in protecting the previable fetus should be given substantial weight in an interestbalancing analysis under Casey.

D. ''Reasoned Judgment" Suggests That the State's Interest in
Protecting the Pre- Viable Fetus Is Almost on Par with Its
Interest in Protecting the Viable Fetus or Full- Term Infant
Let's now compare the state's interest in rescuing the previable fetus via AW with the woman's interest in ensuring the
death of the fetus from the broader standpoint of "reasoned judgment," which includes considering intuitions about the importance of these competing interests at stake. We have seen that
Casey follows Roe in treating the fetus as "potential human life"
rather than actual, normatively human life. 130 Yet we have also
seen that the Casey plurality opinion accords much greater
weight to the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life
than Roe did, that Casey's co-authors were unable (apart from
128. The plurality's "reservations" about the validity of Roe's central holding as an original matter also altered the manner in which the joint opinion reaffirmed Roe's viability
line. Although the plurality opinion invokes both stare decisis and Roe's own explanation
of why viability is the tipping point when the state's interest can override the woman's,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, its defense of the viability line is contingent on the assumption
that the woman's interests outweigh the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life-an assumption the plurality was unwilling to defend on the merits. See id. at 871. Thus, the
plurality opinion depicts the viability line as the most defensible way to delimit the right
to elective abortion, assuming, without deciding, the validity of the interest-balancing
judgment on which that right depends in the first instance.
129. Id. at 845-46 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 871, 876 (plurality opinion).
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"the force of stare· decisis") to affirm that the woman's ~nterest
outweighs that state interest, 131 and that it can fairly be mferre~
that they believed the state's interest was almost as gr~at as (if
not greater than) the woman's overall interest in an elective abo:tion. This juxtaposition may seem highly counterintuitive. How is
it possible to accept for purposes of constitutional law that the fetus is not a normatively human being and yet be persuaded that
the state's interest in protecting this "potential human life" is at
least roughly on par with the woman's weighty interests in terminating her pregnancy?
We cannot be sure from their joint opinion how Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter would have answered this question. Justice White's 1986 dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, however, expressly undertook to do so. 132 Justice White argued that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus even 133
if Roe
is right that the pre-viable fetus is not yet "new human life." His
central thesis was that
[h]owever one answers the metaphysical or theological question
whether the fetus is a "human being" or the legal question whether
it is a "person" as that term is used in the Constitution, one must at
least recognize ... that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells
all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that
131
species from all others.

As a living human organism that is developing into a normatively
human being, the fetus is qualitatively different from sperm or
egg, and the fact that abortion "involves the destruction of the fetus renders it different in kind from the decision not to conceive
in the first place." 135
In Thornburgh, Justice White used this reasoning as a platform to argue that Roe should be overruled. My goal here is a
more limited one: on the assumption that the right to elective
131. Id. at 871.
132. 476 U.S. 747, 785-86 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 792-93 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the difference between contraception and abortion-the destruction of the fetus-goes both to "the weight of the state
interest in regulat[ion]" and "the characterization of the liberty interest [as fundamental]";
id. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state's interest is compelling throughout pregnancy).
134. Id. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
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abortion remains good law (whether solely on stare decisis
grounds or also as an original matter), I will argue that the
state's interest in rescuing the pre-viable fetus outweighs the
woman's interest in ensuring that it does not survive the abortion. And I will do so within the framework of Casey's interestbalancing methodology, which calls for a "reasoned judgment"
about the relative weights of the competing state and individual
136
interests. In arriving at a reasoned judgment on such matters,
it is necessary to describe the grounds on which one's judgment is
based, explain why one values pre-viable fetal life more or less
highly, and critically examine why those who disagree arrive at a
different value.
How much weight, then, should we attach to state protection of
the pre-viable fetus, understood as a living organism that is bio137
logically human but not yet normatively human? To evaluate
the life of the fetus, we must start with the event that begins its
life: the completion of the process of fertilization, which yields the
zygote that is the first stage of fetal life. As Justice White saw,
this event marks a dramatic, qualitative change-the beginning
138
of a new, biologically human life. Unlike sperm and egg, the
pre-viable fetus is a genetically complete, biologically human organism. It is perhaps debatable whether sperm and egg are better
viewed as specialized parts of the men and women whose gametes
they are, or as distinct organisms "whose existence is fundamen139
tally oriented toward uniting with another gamete." What is not

136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (majority opinion) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.").
137. My account of the fetus is greatly indebted to Robert P. George and Christopher
Tollefsen. See generally HOBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A
DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE (2008) [hereinafter EMBRYO]. Unlike their book, however, this
article does not argue that "the human embryo is a human person worthy of full moral respect." Id. at 4.
138. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
139. EMBRYO supra note 137, at 39. The fact that sperm and egg play a functional role
in the lives of the human beings whose gametes they are-enabling those beings to reproduce-argues for considering them as parts, rather than distinct organisms. See id. at 34
(arguing that sperm and egg are "parts of the human organism, the sperm a part of the
male, the egg a part of the female"). The fact that sperm and egg are genetically distinct
from all other cells of the human beings whose gametes they are-not only because they
are haploid rather than diploid, but because their chromosomes are genetically different
as a result of chromosomal crossover during meiosis-argues for considering them as distinct haploid organisms that will either die or be transformed through fertilization "into a
single entity, the human embryo." Id. at 31-32, 35-37.
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debatable is that neither sperm nor egg is a genetically complete
organism belonging to our species. Sperm and egg each h.ave only
one-half of the forty-six chromosomes that ·every somatic ce.n. of
110
every normal member of our species contains. "This haplo1d1ty
of the gamete cells distinguishes them from whole human beings."141 No such distinction exists between the cells of a fetus, ~e
gardless of its stage of development, and those of any other b10logically human being. Once fertilization is complete, the zygote
contains the full complement of forty-six chromosomes necessary
for a complete, biologically human organism.
Possessing forty-six chromosomes, of course, is necessary but
not sufficient to qualify the fetus as a human organism. Every
somatic cell has forty-six chromosomes, 142 but although each cell
is biologically human it is not an organism. Rather, it is a part of
a single human organism-the biologically human beings that
constitute our physical selves. What distinguishes each human
being, viewed as an organism, is that it is an integrated whole
that "has the capability to sustain itself as an independent entity."143 The fetus possesses that capability as soon as conception is
complete: if it can obtain "the resources needed by all organisms,
namely nutrition and a reasonably hospitable environment,144it will
.
(assummg
. a d equate health) to grow an d d e-ye1op. "
cont mue
The fetus's capability to grow and develop is inherent in its nature:115 "It contains within itself the 'genetic programming' and
epigenetic characteristics necessary to direct its own biological
progress. It possesses the active capacity for self-development to146
ward maturity using the information it carries." More than
that, the nature of the fetus is to exercise this capacity: "The human embryo, from conception onward, is fully programmed and
has the active disposition to use that information to develop himId. at 30.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 30.
Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, On Static Eggs and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems
Perspective, NAT. CATH. BIOETHICS QUAR., 659, 666-67 (2002).
144. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 41.
145. In this respect as well, the embryo is radically different from sperm and egg, or
from the nucleus of a non-zygotic cell and an enucleated egg, none of which can grow and
develop without first combining (or being combined) to become an embryo. See id. at 5253. And even when fertilization (or somatic-cell nuclear transfer, in the case of cloning)
occurs'. the gametes (o~ ~ellular components) "do not survive; rather, their genetic material
enters mto the compos1t10n of a new organism." Id. at 53.
146. Id. at 41.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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.self or herself to the mature stage of a human being, and, unless
prevented by disease or violence, will actually do so." 147 The fetus's
dynamic, self-directed biological development shows that it is "a
whole living member of the species Homo sapiens in the earliest
stage[s] of his or her natural development." 118
The pre-viable fetus is also the same living organism that will
later become a viable fetus, infant, child, adolescent, and adult if
its development is not cut short for one reason or another.mi Consequently, the pre-viable fetus, no less than the viable one, has
what Don Marquis famously termed a "future like ours," 150 in
which it will have developed into a conscious, normatively human
being who can actively seek his or her happiness. Like every living being, the fetus has an interest in its own good-and it is good
for the fetus to develop into a normatively human being, and bad
for it to be killed before it can do so. 151
As Roe and Casey require, however, we are assuming that the
life of the pre-viable fetus must be regarded as less valuable than
that of an actual human-"a personO in the whole sense," as Roe
puts it1 52-because its already-present capabilities are not yet sufficiently advanced. But the key question is: How much less valuable? Here, following Justice White's lead, I take issue with the
popular belief that, once it is accepted that the pre-viable fetus is
147. Id. at 50.
148. Id.
149. In the special case of monozygotic twinning, which can occur only in the first two
weeks after conception, the embryo becomes two or more embryos, each of which will de·
velop into a normatively human being. Some writers argue that until the possibility of
monozygotic twinning can be excluded (around fourteen days after conception) the embryo
cannot be regarded as an individual. See, e.g., BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 50-51 (1992). Literally speak·
ing, that seems true enough, but it also seems myopic from the standpoint of valuing the
life of the early embryo. The embryo is a new living organism that will in most cases be·
come one normatively human being, but that will become two normatively human beings if
twinning occurs. That possibility would seem to make it more intrinsically valuable, not
less.
150. Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 191 (1989).
151. Contrary to the common-sense view that ~very living being has an interest in its
own good, manj writers on abortion have asserted that pre-viable fetuses are inherently
incapable of having interests (or rights), because they are not conscious and are thus incapable of having desires or preferences or of feeling pain. See, e.g., HONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 15-19 (1993); STEINBOCK, supra note 149, at 40-41. Because Casey treats the
pre-viable fetus as a living being that has an interest in its own life, this article does not
present an extended argument in defense of the common-sense view, or against the revisionist one.
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (197:3).
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n t a normatively human being, it necessarily follows that its life
iso drastically less valuable tha_n the_ life (and_ other important interests) of a human being. This belief sometimes stems from an
assumption that human bei~gs are ~he only ~iving beings the
state can have an overriding mterest m protectmg on account of
their intrinsic worth. This premise is highly debatable: many observers would endorse intelligent mammals such as dolphins and
15
chimpanzees as counter-examples. :i It is tr~e. ~hat a mature
member of those species has far greater capabilities than a previable fetus. On the other hand, no dolphin or chimpanzee can
match the fetus's innate potential to develop the full capabilities
of a mature human being. If we are prepared to grant great intrinsic value to members of other intelligent species, we should
assign at least as much value to pre-viable fetuses.
Let us assume for argument's sake, however, that the state
cannot claim an overriding interest in protecting non-human beings. So what? The pre-viable fetus cannot be classified as a nonhuman being. Whereas every other living being that is not presently a human being will never be a human being, the fetus's own
nature impels it to become a human being. The fetus is sui generis: it is the one and only living being that is not-yet-human rather than non-human, because it is in the process of becoming
human. Moreover, this process is driven by the fetus itself-its
nature is to become human. It therefore seems incumbent upon
us to assign greater value to the pre-viable fetus than we would to
any non-human animal.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to assign to the life of this not-yethuman being a value that is only modestly lower than the value
we assign to an already-human being (that is, one of us). Within
the conceptual framework established by Roe and Casey, whether
we should do so turns on the relative weight we assign to the "poi53. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREA'l'MENT
OF ANI!',L'\LS 17-20 (1975); STEPHEN WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS 144-54 (2002). The legal protection of endangered species-which is not
predicated on a judgment about the intelligence of each species' members-supplies additional reason to question the claim that the state may only protect the lives of human beings. Protecting endangered species often imposes great costs on human beings, and
thereby demonstrates that the lives of non-human animals can in some circumstances
outweigh even weighty human interests. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 172-73 (1978) (holding that the Endangered Species Act "require[s] the permanent
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100
million" to ensure "the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all
the countless millions of species extant").
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tential" of a human being as against his or her already-developed
"capabilities." Those who would assign a much lower value to the
pre-viable fetus will argue that it lacks the capabilities that make
a human being normatively human, and that those capabilities,
precisely because they are what distinguishes us as human beings and persons, are worthy of much greater weight and respect.
Once we attempt to specify these capabilities, the weakness of
this argument becomes apparent. Given that Roe and Casey (as
well as public opinion) effectively recognize the viable fetus as a
new, normatively human being, 151 it cannot be argued that being
normatively human requires the already-developed abilities to
speak, reason, or exhibit more than the most rudimentary awareness.10'' Unlike a newly implanted embryo, the viable fetus is fully
formed, and many of its organs-such as its heart and kidneysare functioning. 106 But that describes the pre-viable secondtrimester fetus as well. 157 What distinguishes the viable fetus
from fetuses earlier in the second trimester is primarily its more
advanced lung and brain development. 158 Because there is nothing
particularly "human" about our lungs-whereas consciousness,
cognition, language, and emotion are seated in our 'big brains'-it
is not surprising that some defenders of the viability line have
tried to turn it into a proxy for brain development. 15n The difficulty with this move is that the brain development that is crucial for
viability is the brain's ability to maintain homeostasis, 160 rather

154. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (majority opinion); id. at 870 (plurality opinion); Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Lydia Saad, Majority of
Americans Still Support Roe v. Wade Decision, GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.gall
up.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe-wade-decision.aspx.
155. Much the same could be said of full-term newborn infants, and consequently the
argument made here does not turn on whether the threshold for becoming normatively
human is set at viability or full term.
156. Fetal Development Timeline, BABYCENTER, http://www.babycenter.com/O_fctal-dev
elopment-timeline_10357636.bc (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 622 (arguing that at viability the fetal
"brain begins to take on the cortical structure capable of higher mental functioning"). Others have proposed that the right to elective abortion should end when the fetus becomes
capable of organized cortical brain activity. See DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF AllORTJON
116---29 (2003) (arguing that, even erring on the side of caution, this capability docs not
occur prior to the twentieth week, and probably not before the twenty-fifth week).
160. Defined as "[t]he tendency of an organism or a cell to regulate its internal conditions, usually by a system of feedback controls, so as to stabilize health and functioning,
regardless of the outside changing conditions." Homeostasis: Definition, BIOLOGY-ONLINE,
http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Homeostasis.
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than its ability to support higher-order activities such as aware161
. ness and thought.
Nevertheless, by the time of viability, the fetus's cerebral cortex has developed sufficiently that it may have periods of alertness and may be capable of responding to experiences such as
hearing music or human voices. 162 Yet these capabilities, divorced
from the viable fetus's potential for further development,
.
. seem
1 163
less impressive than those of many wild and domestic amma s.
Indeed, as Kent Greenawalt has suggested, if most children "never developed capacities beyond those that newborn babies have,"
and those who would not could be identified at birth, it is unlikely
that we would regard them "as having the inherent worth of developed human beings." 164 It seems accurate to say, therefore, that
when we treat the viable fetus (or, for that matter, the full-term
infant) as a normatively human being, we are in fact giving much
greater weight to its "potential" to further develop its rudimentary capabilities than to those capabilities as they then are. And
if this is so, consistency requires us to give equally great weight
to the "potential" of the pre-viable fetus, which currently lacks
those rudimentary capabilities, but whose future development
will confer and then gradually perfect them.
This point can be generalized: we value every biologically human life-whether that of a fetus, an infant, or an adult-not only for its present capabilities, but also for the continued development and future life that still lies ahead of it. At least in the cases
of fetuses and young children, the lion's share of what we value is
their inherent, self-directed "potential" to continue developing
and live a full human life. If the fetus is aborted before viability,
it will never realize its potential to become normatively human,
165
and will have been deprived of "a future like ours." For that
reason, even assuming the validity of Roe's holding that the state
161. This is demonstrated by the fact that profoundly retarded human beings can live
for many years.
1~2. ·~e~ ~OONIN, supra note 159, at 110-11, 128 (arguing that "organized cortical
bram act1v1ty' pr?bably first occurs between twenty-five and thirty-two weeks of gestation,
and. ~lmost certamly does not occur prior to twenty weeks); Note, The Science, Law, and
Politics of Fetal Pain Legislation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2014 (2002) (fetuses "can respon~ to s~und from 20 weeks and discriminate between different tones from 28 weeks")
(quotmg V1vette Glover & Nicholas M. Fisk, Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and
Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 881 (1999)).
163. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 150-51 (2d ed. 1993).
164. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 132 (1988).
165. Marquis, supra note 150, at 191.

2015)

RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION

1047

cannot claim normatively human status for pre-viable fetal life, 166
the state should be able to assign great value to the fetus beginning at conception, and to assert an interest in protecting the previable fetus that is only modestly less weighty than its interest in
protecting the viable fetus or the full-term infant. It follows that
the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus outweighs
the woman's interest in ensuring its death.
E. The Woman Has No Right to Ensure the Death of the PreViable Fetus If the State Is Prepared to Rescue It, and
Recognizing Such a Right Would Place Inordinately Great
Weight on Fetal Viability
Imagine that, after the invention of AW, a new and untreatable
virus infects a substantial number of pregnant women and their
pre-viable fetuses. The virus normally causes no harmful symptoms to either the woman or her fetus. If, however, the woman's
pregnancy is terminated in a manner that kills the fetus while it
is still within her body, the virus will trigger a systemic autoimmune reaction that severely impairs her health. On the other
hand, once the fetus is removed from her body intact and alive, its
subsequent death will pose no danger to the woman. In this scenario, infected women who wished to terminate their pregnancies
would obviously prefer that a fetus-sparing method be used. But
those who also wished to ensure the deaths of their pre-viable fetuses would want them to be killed (or left to die) after the abortion, rather than gestated in an artificial womb.
Under these circumstances, few observers would deny that the
woman could be compelled to surrender the still-living, pre-viable
aborted fetus for attempted rescue by the state via AW. 167 Although the woman might suffer serious and enduring emotional
distress if the fetus becomes a child, that burden is outweighed by
the benefit of allowing the fetus to become a normatively human
166. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
167. See BOONIN, supra note 159, at 254 (rejecting, as "plainly unacceptable," the claim
that "if the baby survived an attempted abortion, or was born prematurely, before the
woman had an opportunity to have the abortion performed, then she would still have the
right to have it killed"). I don't doubt that there would be exceptions. After all, some intellectuals think that infanticide is morally permissible. See, e.g., Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-Birth Abortion: Why Shonld the Baby Live?, J. MED. ETHICS (2012),
available at http://jme.bmj.com/contentiearly/2012/03/01/medethics-2011-100,! 11.full.pdf+
html. It is much harder to see how anyone could reasonably believe both that infanticide is
impermissible and that it is permissible to kill pre-viable but rescuable fetuses.
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being. And if this is true when the fetus is outside the woman's
body, it should be equally tru,e whe~ the fetus ~s inside her bo~y.
What matters is not the fetus s locat10n, but the fact that state mtervention can enable the fetus to realize its ·potential via AW
without imposing on the woman the burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth. Accordingly, this thought experiment confirms that
the state may prevent the woman (and her doctor) from killing
the rescuable fetus even while it is still inside
her body, so long as
168
the state provides AW at public expense. Notwithstanding her
specially protected liberty interest, the woman is not entitled
to
169
kill the fetus when the state is able and willing to gestate it.
It might be objected that this thought experiment is tainted by
what is generally assumed to be a corollary of Roe's holding that
110
the unborn are not Fourteenth Amendment persons: that anyone born alive is a Fourteenth Amendment person, regardless of
gestational age at birth. Intuitions about the still-living aborted
fetuses in the thought experiment, the argument goes, are colored
by the fact that we think of them as Fourteenth Amendment per111
sons because they have been born alive. Because Fourteenth
Amendment personhood does not extend to the entity fetal-rescue
programs seek to protect-the unborn (albeit rescuable) fetusour intuitions about the treatment of non-viable persons (i.e.,
still-living aborted fetuses) are beside the point.

168. If, on these hypothetical facts, the state were to require any woman who had an
abortion to pay the costs of AW for her aborted fetus, a very different question would be
presented. Those presumably very high costs would deter many women from having the
only kind of abortions that would protect their health under these circumstances (fetussparing ones), and would thus seemingly interfere with the right to elective abortion in the
same way as a ban on an abortion method that is the only safe method in some cases. See
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007) (upholding federal ban on partial-birth abortion
method "given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe
alternatives").
169. I am not arguing that there would be consensus for the proposition that it is unjustifiable to kill the fetus after separation from the woman if it is pre-viable and AW is
not available. In today's world, a pre-viable fetus that survives delivery or extraction from
t~e wo~an's body will die from lack of oxygen, and may well suffer during the minutes it
h_ves. Given these facts, some would argue that the deliberate euthanasia of these previable_ neonates is in their best interest, provided it can be done without inflicting greater
sufferrng on them, and others would argue that even if deliberately killing such a fetus
should be unlawful, it should not be treated as homicide.
170. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
Stat~s ... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.") (emphasis added).
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The short answer to this objection is that very few people derive their intuitions about fetuses that survive abortions from
their understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. The intuition is more a matter of common sense: a still-living fetus that
has been separated from its mother should be rescued if it can be
rescued, whether or not its mother wants it to survive. What explains this intuition? A judgment that the good the state is seeking to do-rescue the fetus so that it can realize its potential to
become "new human life"-clearly outweighs the harm to the
woman whose desire that the fetus die will be frustrated if the
rescue succeeds. 172
A similar intuition arises when we consider the difference between a fetus-killing elective abortion today, and a fetus-killing
elective abortion to prevent the state from rescuing the fetus via
AW. Today, when a woman terminates her pregnancy before viability, the fetus will rapidly and inevitably die even if a fetussparing abortion method is used. Therefore, no great additional
harm is done to this fetus if the abortion is performed using a
method that affirmatively kills it. 173 Should AW be invented, however, fetuses will be rescuable months before they become developmentally viable. If a fetus is rescuable-and if the state offers
to bear the costs of rescuing it-the woman does impose great additional harm on the fetus when she insists on using a fetuskilling abortion method. For in so doing, she eliminates what
would otherwise be the fetus's realistic chance of surviving via
AW. Whereas currently the woman's refusal to gestate the previable fetus can arguably be justified on the grounds that she has
no duty to rescue the fetus herself, no such justification can be offered for her refusal to allow the state to rescue the pre-viable fetus. Only if the woman has the right affirmatively to kill her previable fetus is a fetus-killing abortion justifiable under these circumstances.

172. Beyond that, the objection's premise may well be mistaken. The Supreme Court
has never defined what it means to be "born" alive for Fourteenth Amendment purposes,
and the Court's understanding of birth, like its understanding of viability, may include an
implicit developmental requirement. In particular, it is far from clear that the Court
would hold that a first-trimester aborted fetus which will die in a matter of minutes unless
placed in an artificial womb has been "born" alive and is thus a Fourteenth Amendment
person.
173. This formulation assumes that the fetus will be killed painlessly, or at any rate
before it can consciously experience pain.
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To recognize such a constitutional right would c~eate . ~ dramatic and indefensible disparity between the state s abih~y to
protect pre-viable fetuses and its parallel ability to protect viable
ones. At viability, the state may prohibit elective abortions .altogether-thus imposing on the woman a duty to gestat~ h~~ viable
fetus, as well as to refrain from killing it. Prior to viability, the
state would not only be forbidden to mandate that the woman
gestate the fetus; it would be forbidden to override her insistence
that the fetus be killed lest the state rescue it via AW.
This enormous disparity in treatment is unjustifiable unless
the state's interest in protecting the fetus is dramatically stronger at viability. As Part III.D argued, this is not the case: the
state's interest in protecting the viable fetus is only modestly
greater than its interest in protecting the pre-viable one. What is
more, the development of AW will significantly reduce the differences between pre-viable and viable fetuses. Currently, they differ in two respects: the pre-viable fetus is less developed, and it is
exclusively dependent on the woman for its survival. Post-AW,
the pre-viable fetus will still be less developed. Thanks to AW,
however, the pre-viable fetus will no longer be exclusively dependent on the woman's uterus. That leaves the viable fetus's
more advanced development as the only basis for assigning greater weight to the state's interest in protecting it. Even if more advanced development can reasonably be given significant weight, it
cannot reasonably be given far greater weight than the unique
potential to become normatively human with which fetuses are
endowed regardless of their gestational age.
Faced with the problem of defending a viability line that has
such extreme consequences, pro-choice advocates may argue that
fetal-rescue programs, even if constitutional as to fetuses that are
a~proaching viability, are unconstitutional as applied to the first
trimester, when the vast majority of abortions are performed. If
Roe were still controlling, its assertion that the state's interest in
protecting fetal life "grows in substantiality as the woman appr?aches term" 171 would support this argument. But Casey consp~c~ous.ly does not endorse Roe's dictum, and the Casey plurality
opm10n is more consistent with the view that there are two criti~al stages in early human development-conception and viability-than with a sliding-scale approach in which the state's inter174.

Roe v. Wade, 4iO U.S. 115, at 162-63 (1973).
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est incrementally increases from week to week. 110 On that understanding, the state's interest is as weighty prior to implantation
as it is shortly before viability, and fetal-rescue programs are constitutional as applied to fetuses at all stages of development.

F. Whether the Woman's Interest Is Viewed as Avoiding
Emotional Distress or Acting on Convictions About
Responsible Parenting, It Is Less Weighty Than the State's
Interest in the Rescuable Fetus
In the final analysis, evaluating the constitutionality of fetalrescue programs requires weighing the life of the rescuable fetus
against the woman's emotional distress if the fetus survives via
AW. 176 Although there is no direct way to measure the weights
that should be assigned to these opposing interests, the balance
struck by fetal-rescue programs is more reasonable than the balance that would be struck by a constitutional ruling invalidating
them.
Women who want fetus-killing abortions will likely experience
emotional distress if they must instead have fetus-sparing abortions and relinquish their fetuses to the state for attempted rescue via AW. In some cases, aversion to that emotional distress
will induce women to forgo fetus-sparing abortions, travel to jurisdictions where fetus-killing abortions are legal, or obtain such
abortions illegally. These consequences attest to the serious and
long-lasting nature of the emotional distress some women fear
they would suffer if their fetuses survive via state-provided AW.
Nevertheless, that distress is likely to be palliated by the fact
that the woman can relinquish her ties to the fetus early in pregnancy, when her emotional attachment to it is comparatively
weak, rather than after gestating and giving birth to it. 177 Avoid175. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 869-71 (1992) (plurality opinion).
176. One might argue that the costs of rescuing the fetus include both the woman's
emotional distress and the expense to the public of rescuing the fetus via AW, but by the
same token the benefits include both the benefit of continued life to the fetus and the indirect benefits to the public of a new citizen should AW succeed.
177. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra, note 36, at 2-3 (detailing a
birth parent's grief after giving up her child for adoption). The subset of women who develop very strong emotional ties to their early-stage fetuses may also be more likely to experience guilt and regret should they have fetus-killing abortions despite the availability
of AW. Put another way, some of these women may be so conflicted about their pregnancies (and their fetuses) that they would suffer significant, long-lasting emotional distress
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· g this level of emotional distress is an insufficient justification
~~r deliberately killing a living being that could survive and be118
come a child via state-provided AW. In balancing terms, it is
unreasonable to assign less weight to the life (and future) of the
fetus than to a single aspect of the woman's well-being that, while
important, 179 lacks the life-changing quality of the postnatal raiseor-relinquish dilemma. As Casey suggests, carrying an unwanted
child to term, giving birth to it, and then, as a birth mother, confronting the raise-or-relinquish dilemma may in many cases
180
"shape" the woman's "destiny." Having a fetus-sparing abortion
and relinquishing the fetus to be gestated by the state seems
highly unlikely to have effects of that magnitude.
But perhaps there is more to the woman's interest in ensuring
the death of her pre-viable fetus than avoiding emotional distress.
Several writers have suggested that women who seek to ensure
the deaths of their fetuses typically do so for reasons of conscience
that should carry especially great weight. For example, Leslie
Cannold maintains that what she memorably describes as women's '"killing from care' decisions" stem from deeply held views
181
about what it means to be a good, responsible mother. Along
even if the state simply offered AW as an option.
178. Glenn Cohen argues that
[w]hile compelled unwanted gestational and legal parenthood has obvious
tangible effects on an individual, compelled genetic parenthood does not
when it does not carry with it any gestational or legal burdens. It may cause
emotional distress, but ... while an individual has an interest in avoiding
these negative emotional effects ... it is not at all clear that we think that interest is superordinate or of constitutional significance.
Cohen, Rights Not to Procreate, supra note 79, at 1165. Insofar as the emotional distress to
which Cohen refers involves only a woman's general desire not to reproduce, his analysis
may be right (although query whether the right to contraception affords some protection
from that emotional distress). But insofar as it involves a woman's intense aversion to relinquishing her offspring to be nurtured and raised by others, the analysis presented in
Part IV shows that this interest does have "constitutional significance" under Casey. The
decisive question, however, is how much weight to assign to this interest: for the reasons
given in text, I agree with Cohen that this form of emotional distress should not constitute
a "superordinate" interest as against the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus.
179. Although our legal tradition increasingly protects persons from the unwarranted
infliction of emotional distress by others, in some contexts the law clearly assigns less
weight to avoiding emotional distress than to avoiding physical or dignitary injury. For
example, '''l'he privilege of self-defense typically applies when the injury threatened consists of physical harm, inappropriate touching, or confinement," but "does not apply if the
conduct in question threatens only to result in ... distress toO the victim." JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG, AN'I'HONY J. SEBOK, & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES
AND REDRESS 652 (3d ed. 2012).
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (majority opinion).
181. See LESLIE CANNOLD, 'l'HE ABORTION MYTH: FEMINISM, MORALITY, AND THE HARD
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similar lines, Stephen Ross suggests that many women see childbearing as "one of the more important things [they] ever do," and
"want to do it in a responsible way; that is, only when [they] can
raise [the child] in a loving, attentive, unambivalent fashion." 182
For women with these values, Ross argues that abortion is "best
seen ... as the only means by which they can regain their situation antecedent to pregnancy where there simply was no child
and consequently no one with whom to either succeed or fail as a
parent." 183 Stephen Coleman agrees, although he concedes that
because "the foetus is a potential person, some special justification would appear to be necessary in order to kill it." 181 Like Ross,
Coleman finds this justification in the woman's urgent need to
avoid "the special relationship" the fetus will have with her after
birth-a relationship that will violate her sense of what it means
to be a "good parent," whether she keeps the child or relinquishes
it.185
Distinguishing genuinely idealistic beliefs about being a good
mother from self-serving rationalizations is not an easy task. I
will avoid that problem by focusing on women whose decisions
can rightly be characterized as conscientious. We then have a
conflict between the woman's deeply held belief that her fetus
should not survive the termination of her pregnancy, and the
state's contrary view that the fetus is not hers to kill, but rather a
future person (and citizen) the state is entitled to rescue if it can.
Arguments that women should be allowed to kill their fetuses
because they have deeply held ethical reasons for doing so frequently presuppose that the fetus has no significant intrinsic value that society may recognize and protect. Coleman, for example,
asserts that "the moral status of the embryo is very nearly the
same as the moral status of the gametes that produce that embryo, and that the developing human does not acquire significant
intrinsic moral status until sometime well into pregnancy," when
it becomes "sentient." 186 This position is flatly contradicted by Casey's emphatic recognition that "there is a substantial state inter-

CHOICES WOMEN MAKE 135 (1998).
182. Stephen L. Ross, Abortion and the Death of the Fetus, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 232,
241 (1982).
183. Id.
184. STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES 132 (2004).
185. Id. at 130-32.
186. Id. at 105, 114-15.
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est in potential life throughout pregnancy." 187 Precedent aside, the
arguments I have presented provide strong reasons to reject
Coleman's value judgment and treat all fetal life as endowed with
"significant intrinsic moral status."
Some, however, might argue that even if the state may assign
great intrinsic value to the fetus, the woman's convictions should
tip the balance in favor of her choice to have a fetus-killing abortion. Although Casey recognizes that such beliefs "may originate
within the zone of conscience and belief," it also reaffirms that
abortion's "consequences ... for the life or potential life that is
aborted" demand that states be able to "act in some degree to further their own legitimate interests in protecting prenatal life." 188
The conscientious character of the woman's beliefs helps make
the case that her liberty to act on them should be specially protected, yet those beliefs are not a trump. Unlike prohibitions on
elective abortion, fetal-rescue programs do not deprive the woman
of "all choice in the matter" 189 of dealing with her unwanted pregnancy. They leave her free to terminate her pregnancy, but forbid
her to choose a fetus-killing abortion that would frustrate the
state's efforts to rescue her fetus via AW. And they do so on the
eminently defensible ground that the state's interest in preserving the life and future of the fetus is weightier than the woman's
desire to "regain [her] situation antecedent to pregnancy where
there simply was no child." 190
Moreover, however conscientious their beliefs, women facing
unwanted pregnancies are subject to a conflict of interest that can
distort their judgments about whether the gains to them from an
elective abortion outweigh the harm to their pre-viable fetuses. 191
To be sure, there is also a real risk that the state will enact overly
broad prohibitions on elective abortions because the woman, not
the state, bears the antenatal and postnatal burdens of pregnan187. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 852-53 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 850.
190. Ross, supra note 182, at 241.
191. 'l'his point is not confined to women confronting unwanted pregnancies. Devaluing
the fetus serves our own self-interest (as persons whose personhood is beyond question) as
well as the interests of persons we care about and identify with. See id. As one perspicacious defender of the permissibility of abortion has written, "We should ... be wary of the
possibility of abortion becoming an unreflective practice, like meat eating, simply because
it serves the interests of those who have the power to determine whether it is practiced."
,JEFF MCMAHAN, THE Ennes OF KILLING: PROULEMS AT 1'HE MARGINS OF LIFE viii (2002).
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cy. In the context of fetal-rescue programs, however, the state's
judgment is less likely to be skewed: rather than requiring the
woman to bear the burdens of pregnancy and child-rearing (or
child-relinquishing), the state is assuming the burdens of gestating-and finding suitable parents for--the aborted fetus. Under
these circumstances, there is all the more reason to permit the
state to conclude that the gains to the pre-viable fetus outweigh
the harm the woman will suffer if her desire to ensure the death
of the fetus is frustrated by state-provided AW.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE REGULATION OF THE CREATION,
DESTRUCTION, AND INDEFINITE NON-USE OF CRYOPRESERVED
EMBRYOS

The preconditions for fetal-rescue programs-the availability of
fetus-sparing abortions and artificial wombs at all stages of pregnancy-do not yet exist. By contrast, in vitro fertilization and
cryopreserved embryos are an established feature of reproduction
in the United States today. 192 This part applies the reasoning of
Part III to state laws regulating the treatment of cryopreserved
embryos.
Cryopreserved embryos are embryos that are frozen at belowzero temperatures at the pre-implantation stage. 193 As its name
suggests, cryopreservation can preserve the embryo for long periods of time, while simultaneously preventing it from continuing
to develop. 194 Cryopreserved embryos retain the ability (once
thawed) to develop and successfully implant at roughly the same
rate as fresh embryos. 195 It is unknown whether cryopreserved
embryos eventually become unable to implant or develop, but

192. JOHN HOPKINS MEDICINE, Options for Women Before Treatment, http://www.hopk
insmedicine .org/gynecology_obstetrics/specialty_areas/fertility_services/fertility_preserva
tion/options_fcr_women_before_treatment.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
193. GEORGIA REPRODUCTIVE SPECIALISTS, Human Embryo Cryopreservation, http://
www.ivf.com/cryo.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
194. Melonyce McAfee, Ice Ice Baby: How Long Can You Keep an Embryo Frozen?,
SLATE (Jan. 16, 2007, 7:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer
/2007/01/ice_ice_baby .html.
195. THE ONCOFERTILITY CONSORTIUM AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, Chance of
Pregnany After Oocyte Cryopreservation, http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/oocyte-cryo
preservation (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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pregnancies have been reported from embryos stored for as many
as twenty years. 1913

It is estimated that there are now more than 600,000 cryopreserved embryos in the United States.un Disputes between biological parents over the disposition of their cryopreserved embryos have led to several state court decisions, 198 but there has been
little, if any, litigation over state regulation of the treatment of
cryopreserved embryos. 199 For simplicity, I will focus on a hypothetical state law that aims to rescue cryopreserved embryos under certain circumstances, and will assume that the biological
parents agree about what should be done with the cryopreserved
embryos they have created. The hypothetical embryo-rescue program200 contains the following key provisions:
It shall be unlawful to destroy a cryopreserved embryo that is capable of resuming its development after being implanted in the
womb of a gestational mother.
If the biological parents decline to pay the storage costs of continued cryopreservation, the facility where the embryos are stored must
transfer custody of the embryos to the state. The state will pay the
storage costs and will attempt to find a voluntary gestational mother
for each embryo.
If the biological parents are paying the costs of continued cryopreservation for the embryos they created, but fail to arrange for the implantation of the embryos either in the biological mother or some
other woman within twenty years after the embryos are created, custody of the embryos must be transferred to the state, which will assume the costs of continued storage and will attempt to find a willing
gestational mother for each embryo.
To prevent the use of the right to elective abortion to frustrate the
purposes of the embryo-rescue program, it shall be unlawful to ar-

196. See Mara Hvistendahl, Baby Born From 20-Year-Old Frozen Embryo, POPULAR
SCIENCE (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-10/baby-born-20-year
-old-frozen-embryo.
197. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Embryo Adoption, http://www.hss.gov/opa/
about-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
198. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that
"decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers alone ... because no one else bears the
consequences of these decisions in the way" they do).
199. See, e.g., id. at 590 (noting the "uniqueness of the [issue]" and the seeming absence
of litigation); Jennifer Hodges, Comment, Thursday's Child: Litigation over Possession of
Cryopreserved Embryos as a Call for Legislation, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 257, 262 (1999)
("Relatively little litigation exists surrounding the IVF procedure and the disposition of
cryogenically preserved embryos.").
200. In some respects, this hypothetical statute draws on Louisiana's statute regulating the disposition of cryopreserved embryos. See LA. REV. S'l'AT. ANN. § 9:121-9:133
(2008).
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range for the implantation of cryopreserved embryos with the intent
to terminate the pregnancy for the purpose of destroying them.

The first question that must be answered in evaluating the
constitutionality of this embryo-rescue program is whether cryopreserved embryos qualify as pre-viable fetuses. As Part III
showed, Roe recognized the state's important interest in "potential human life" beginning at conception, 201 and Casey's description of Roe as "concern[ed] with postconception potential life" 202
reaffirms that understanding. Thus, whether cryopreserved embryos come within the ambit of the state's interest in protecting
fetal life depends on whether they are frozen-and their development suspended-before conception is complete. The question
of when conception is complete thus turns out to be the critical
question on which the constitutional status of cryopreserved em203
bryos turns.
To simplify somewhat, there are two competing positions. The
first, endorsed by the President's Council on Bioethics, holds that
conception is complete "at syngamy when the diploid embryonic
genome is constructed from the chromosomes contributed by the
sperm and the egg .... roughly twenty-four hours after penetra201
tion of the egg by a sperm." The second, for which some scientists and bioethicists argue, is that conception is not complete until the embryonic genome is activated and begins actively
directing the embryo's development (a task initially performed by
the fertilized egg's mitochondrial DNA and specialized enzymes
205
contained in its cytoplasm). This development occurs at approximately the eight-cell stage, "roughly forty-eight to seventy-two
hours after insemination of the egg," when the embryo begins to
grow in size (rather than simply subdividing), and when its indi206
vidual cells cease to be totipotent and cell differentiation begins.
Because cryopreserved embryos are typically frozen at the four-,
six-, or eight-cell stage, they would clearly qualify as "postconception" life for constitutional purposes under the syngamy definition

201. Hoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 159 (1972).
202. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority
opinion).
203. See Peters, supra note 18, at 199-200.
204. Id. at 228; see id. at 212.
205. Id. at 212-13.
206. Id. Some scientists believe that the activation of the embryonic genome occurs
even later. See text accompanying note 223 infra.
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of conception, but would fail to qualify under the genomicactivation definition. 207
Although a comprehensive treatment of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article, I will summarize the arguments for these
competing accounts of when conception is complete, and explain
why the syngamy theory seems more persuasive. In doing so, I
will draw on the illuminating treatments of the topic by Robert
George and Christopher Tollefsen, who argue that conception is
complete "no later than at syngamy," 208 and by Philip Peters, who
argues that conception is not complete until the diploid genome is
activated, which occurs (at the earliest) at the six-cell or eight-cell
stage of development. 209 For ease of exposition, I will adopt Peters'
terminology, which treats the completion of conception as the
210
point at which "a new human embryo" has come to be.
The following basic facts are not in dispute. The process of conception starts when a sperm penetrates the outer wall of the
ovum. 211 This triggers the division of the ovum's forty-six chromosomes into two sets of twenty-three chromosomes, one of which is
expelled from the ovum. 212 The fertilized egg-still a single cellnow contains the full complement of forty-six chromosomes
(twenty-three from the sperm, twenty-three from the egg) necessary for the development of a human being. 213 During the initial
stages of fertilization, the DNA in these chromosomes is chemically inactivated by the ovum's mitochondrial DNA, and development is controlled by the ovum's mitochondrial DNA and by
enzymes contained in the cell's cytoplasm. 211 At their direction,
207. Peters, supra note 18, at 217. The status of eight-cell embryos under genomicactivation definition is not altogether clear, and might even turn on whether the embryo is
in the early or late phases of the eight-cell stage. What seems clear, however, is that if
only embryos with at least eight cells were deemed to be postconception life for purposes of
constitutional law, !VF clinics could adjust their practices so that embryos were
cryopreserved at the four- or six-cell stage. See id. at 200 (arguing that "laws triggered by
conception should not take effect until the process of conceiving a new diploid embryo is
complete," which "occurs when the embryonic genome begins to function ... at the eightcell stage").
208. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 38.
209. See Peters, supra note 18, at 200.
210. Id. at 199-200. George and Tollefson frame the question in terms of when "the
zygote comes to be." EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 38.
211. Peters, supra note 18, at 205.
212. Id. at 206, 208.
213. Id. at 208-09.
214. Id. at 207. The sperm's mitochondrial DNA is destroyed after penetration of the
egg, and plays no role in these processes. Id.
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the cell forms two pronuclei, one containing the "paternal" chromosomes and the other containing the "maternal" chromosomes.215 Each pronucleus then duplicates its chromosomes, again
in response to the cell's mitochondrial DNA and enzymes. 216
After duplication is complete, the membranes of the two pronuclei dissolve, and the chromosomes migrate to the center of the
cell. 211 Approximately twenty-four hours after fertilization, the
two sets of maternal and paternal chromosomes align themselves
to form two complete sets of chromosomes (syngamy). 218 The resulting one-celled zygote shortly thereafter undergoes "cleavage"
into two cells, each of which contains a complete human genome
in its nucleus. 219
Peters describes the situation at this juncture as follows:
At syngamy, however, the newly assembled embryonic genome is
still dormant. Activation will not occur until its nuclear DNA has
been demethylated and the genes begin transcribing DNA. Many authorities believe that this occurs at about the eight-cell stage, roughly forty-eight to seventy-two hours after insemination of the egg.
Others believe activation occurs much later .... at the thirty-two to
sixty-four cell stage .... [or even at] the morula stage, roughly four
to seven days after insemination when the embryo has hundreds of
cells. 'l'hus, most scientists believe that the new embryonic genome
takes control of embryonic development no sooner than the six- to
eight-cell stage and possibly as long as several days later.""
')•)o

Given these facts, George and Tollefsen frame the issue as follows: "When is there a single biological system with a developmental trajectory, or active developmental program, toward the
mature stage of a human being? That is a question for which
there is, in principle, a definitive scientific answer." 221 The answer, in their view, is that conception is complete "once the sperm
has entered and united with the oocyte."222 The sperm breaks up
except for its nucleus, which remains in the ovum; the ovum's ex215. Id. at 208-09. Although the "maternal" chromosomes are inherited from the
mother, and the "paternal" chromosomes are inherited from the father, they are genetically distinct from each parent's own chromosomes,· due to the recombination of genes that
occurs during meiosis in both sperm and egg. See EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 31-32.
216. Peters, supra note 18, at 209.
217. Id. at 210.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 210-11.
220. Id. at 212-13.
221. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 39.
222. Id. at 38.

----
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ternal membrane (the zona pellucida) hardens to prevent fertilization by another sperm; and the ovum completes its second meiotic division. 22 :3 These changes, they argue, show that sperm and
ovum are no longer "distinct organic parts," each with its own
"distinct identity." 221
George and Tollefson recognize, however, that it does not necessarily follow that when sperm and ovum lose their distinct
identities, a new organism has come into being. Their argument,
rather, is that the hardening of the zona, the lining up of the maternal and paternal chromosomes in preparation for syngamy,
and the second meiotic division are evidence that "there now appears to be a distinct organism directing its own processes of
growth and development." 225 Accordingly, they suggest that a new
human embryo comes into being even before the completion of
syngamy. 22 But even if there is no new human embryo prior to
the formation of the zygote, George and Tollefson maintain, the
zygote unquestionably qualifies: it is genetically unique, its sex is
determined, it has (two copies of) the full complement of forty-six
chromosomes, and it is a totipotent cell that contains within itself
all the genetic information necessary to direct its own development.221
(i

Peters argues for a very different characterization of the embryological facts. Here is the core of his argument:
[Prior to activation of the diploid genome,] the development of the
inseminated egg is not governed by either its original haploid genome or its forthcoming diploid genome. Instead, the transition is
driven by materials in the cytoplasm of the egg. Thus, the period of
transition is more aptly characterized as cytoplasmic than as haploid
or diploid. This transitional cytoplasmic stage briefly bridges the
boundary betwe~n more important haploid and diploid stages in the
8
human life cycle.""

At bottom, this amounts to a claim that the inseminated eggeven after it becomes a zygote-although no longer a functioning
haploid gamete, is not yet a functioning diploid organism. 229 In

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39-41.
Peters, supra note 18, at 205.
See icl.

-."~
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Peters' view, there is no new human embryo until the embryonic
genome begins to direct the organism's development. 230 Only when
"the new diploid genome assumes principal governance of the
embryo's development" and "takes over from the maternal enzymes that directed development during the transformation from
the haploid to the diploid stages of the human life cycle" is conception complete-and only then is there a new human embryo. 231
Peters' account is both factually and morally unsound. Peters
treats the new diploid genome as if it alone is constitutive of a
new human organism, to the exclusion of what he calls the "maternal mitochondrial DNA." 232 But although that mitochondrial
DNA is ordinarily identical to the mother's mitochondrial DNA, it
is misleading to call it "maternal"-as if her DNA were still directing the ovum's development. Putting aside mutations, which
occur roughly once per 1000 generations, the mother's mitochondrial DNA is genetically identical to her mother's mitochondrial
DNA, and so on up the matrilineal line of descent.z:i:i For that reason, it is more accurate to describe mitochondrial DNA as matrilineal DNA: it is neither unique to the woman whose egg has
been fertilized, nor to the egg. 231 Both the ovum's "maternal"
chromosomes and its mitochondrial DNA were contributed by the
embryo's mother, but they are integral components of the fertilized ovum while it is becoming, and after it becomes, a zygote. 2:i''
The "cytoplasm" Peters wants to treat as the basis for a third
(and transitory) stage of human existence is the cytoplasm of a
living cell that no longer behaves like a haploid ovum after it is
penetrated by a sperm cell. 236 That cell behaves like a new organism whose mitochondrial DNA directs the assembly of its diploid
genome-which will in turn direct the later stages of the organism's development. 237
Nor does Peters ever explain why a functioning-in the sense
of controlling-diploid genome should be a prerequisite to status
See id. at 228.
Id. at 2rn.
Id. at 207, 21a
Stephen Oppenheimer, Mitochondrial DNA: The Eve Gene, BRADSHAW FOUND.,
http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/journey/eve.html (last visited Apr. a, 2015).
234. See id. It is not a distinctive attribute belonging to the ovum's mother-it is an
attribute shared by the entire line. See id.
235. Id.; Peters, supra note at 18, at 207.
2:36. Id. at 205.
237. See id. at 213.
2ao.
2ai.
2Cl2.
2Cl3.
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as a new human embryo. 238 The maternal and paternal chromosomes do not direct the initial post-fertilization developments, but
they certainly continue to function: they replicate themselves,
239
they move, and they combine at syngamy. That these actions
are carried out in response to chemical signals from mitochondrial DNA which was present in the ovum before it was fertilized
does not prove that no new organism exists. On the contrary, it is
precisely because the sperm penetrated the ovum, thereby triggering changes that "activated" its mitochondrial DNA, that the
mitochondrial DNA temporarily assumes this directive role.
Peters also overlooks the nature of the "potential" that gives
rise to a profound state interest in protecting postconception, biologically human life under Roe and Casey. He argues that the fertilized ovum's potential to become a child "seems insufficient to
explain the normative role assigned to conception," because
"[a]rguably, similar potential is created whenever a sperm and
ovum are placed in the same petri dish," and yet "no one seriously
argues that the selection of two gametes constitutes conception."210 This argument depends on an equivocation: when sperm
and ovum are placed in the same petri dish it is likely that they
will combine to form an organism that is capable of directing its
241
own development and becoming a child. But those who argue
that the embryo's "potential" is morally and legally significant are
referring to the latter meaning (potential as the capacity for selfdirected, organic development) not the former (possibility or
probability). 212 Only after fertilization is the latter type of potential present.
Finally, Peters argues that "[o]nly a functioning diploid genome
confers on humans the potential to develop the higher capacities
that make humans morally distinct." 213 This is simply false. The
e~bryo's assembled diploid genome already has the "potential" to
direct the embryo's development, and it will begin to exercise that

238. Pe~ers simply asserts that "[o]nly a functioning diploid genome confers on humans
the potential to de".elop the. higher capacities that make humans morally distinct." Id. at
227. I respond to this assertion below. See text accompanying notes 247-48 infra.
239. Id. at 210-11.
240. Id. at 220.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 227.

2015]

RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION

1063

capability when the developing zygote itself "activates" its chromosomes at (on Peters' account) the six-cell or eight-cell stage. 211
Thus, once the zygote is formed, there is a new, biologically
human organism that has begun to direct its own development.
As such, the zygote qualifies as a new human embryo-and as
"postconception potential life" 21 " for purposes of constitutional
law. Consequently, the state has the same interest in protecting
four-, six-, and eight-cell embryos that are cryopreserved by IVF
clinics that it has in protecting all other pre-viable fetuses. 216 Under Casey, the state's important interest in protecting "the life of
the fetus that may become a child" 211 extends to the cryopreserved
embryo no less than to the second-trimester fetus on the threshold of viability.
The state's interest in protecting cryopreserved embryos obviously is advanced by a legal prohibition on destroying them. It
would likewise be advanced by a requirement that the genetic
parents of the embryos pay for their continued cryopreservation,
and by a provision that the state will pay for their cryopreservation if the parents are unable to do so. But what about legal requirements that the cryopreserved embryos be transferred to the
state for embryo adoption unless they are implanted, either in
their genetic mother or in another woman, within a certain time?
Cryopreservation prevents the fetus from achieving its potential
and becoming a normatively human being, and therefore impli-

244. Id. at 213.
245. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority opinion).
246. In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), the Tennessee Supreme Court
argued that Tennessee's trimester-based system of abortion regulation supported an inference that "the state's interest in the potential life embodied by these four- to eight-cell
preembryos ... at best slight," and concluded that "the state's interest in the potential life
of these preembryos is not sufficient to justify any infringement upon the freedom of [the
biological parents] to make their own decisions as to whether to allow a process to contin·
ue that may result in such a dramatic change in their lives as becoming parents." Id. at
602. Although the Davis Court's interest-balancing analysis was conducted in the course of
interpreting the state constitution, it could easily be recast as an application of Roe's suggestion that the state's interest gradually increases throughout pregnancy. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 162-63 (1973). The plurality opinion in Casey, however, not only
declined to endorse Roe's dictum; it characterized the state's interest in all postconception
"potential life" as "profound," not slight. 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). Moreover, the
Davis court did not consider the respects in which the woman's interest in not becoming a
genetic parent is less weighty than her overall interests in an elective abortion. 842
S.W.2d at 603-04. Viewed as if it were a Fourteenth Amendment interest-balancing judgment, then, Davis-which was decided before Casey- does not survive that decision.
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion).
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cates the state's interest in ensuring that the fetus has the opportunity to become a child. There is, however, a complication: it
could be argued that the fetus is no better off being gestated now
than at some point in the indefinite future. But no one knows
whether there is a time limit on the "shelf life" of cryopreserved
embryos, or, if there is a limit, what it is. Indefinite cryopreservation may decrease or eliminate a given embryo's chance of becoming a child even if it is eventually implanted. By requiring that
embryos be made available for third-party implantation, if the
woman does not gestate them herself within a reasonable time after they are cryopreserved (e.g., twenty years), the state advances
its important interest in ensuring that pre-viable fetuses realize
their potential to become children. 218
Let us now turn to the woman's liberty interest in deciding
what will become of her cryopreserved embryos. In the abortion
context, the woman's liberty overrides that of the fetus's father
because she alone bears the burdens of pregnancy and child219
birth. In the cryopreserved embryo context, those burdens are
not present (although the burdens of obtaining eggs for IVF are
considerably greater than the burdens of obtaining sperm). 250 'l'o
bypass the complications that arise when one biological parent
wants the embryos to be destroyed (or preserved indefinitely) and
the other wants them to be gestated, I will assume that both parents agree that the embryos should not be gestated. In the abortion context, the Court has never suggested that the state would
need a stronger interest to override the joint decision of both parents than it does to override the woman's unilateral decision. Accordingly, I will focus solely on the woman's liberty interest in deciding what is done with her cryopreserved embryos.
The next question is whether the woman's liberty interest in

~estro~ing or otherwise preventing the gestation of her embryos

is specially protected. Technically, neither the right to use contraception nor the right to elective abortion applies to the destruc2'~8. In additioi:, unless t~e biological parents are able to pay for indefinite cryopreserv~ti?n•. t~e state will be reqmred to do so. The state certainly has an important interest in

m.1mmizmg such payments by arranging for the cryopreserved embryos to be implanted
w1thm a reasonable period of time.
249. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
250. The woman must.first receive hormone shots, and then undergo a surgical egg.
remov.al process that requires anesthesia. See Sandra T. Jimenez "My Body My Right"· A
Look into IVF Regulation Through the Abortion Legal Framew~rh 33 Wo'MEN'S HTS. L
IWP. 375, 379-80 (2012).
'
. .
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tion of cryopreserved embryos. If the right to use contraception is
the right to prevent conception-its literal meaning-it cannot
apply to new, postconception life; 251 if the right to contraception is
the right to avoid becoming pregnant, and thus includes methods
that prevent an embryo from implanting in the woman's uterus,
it has no application to a cryopreserved embryo, which poses no
252
risk of implantation in its current state and location. As for the
right to elective abortion, the woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability has no application to the cryopreserved
embryo precisely because she is not pregnant with it.
Nevertheless, it seems evident that the woman's liberty interest in not reproducing remains specially protected even when it
does not fit within the categories of contraception or abortion. Casey's broad understanding of the woman's protected liberty encompasses the full range of deeply personal decisions about
whether or not to bring children into the world. 253 Given that the
woman has a specially protected liberty interest in ensuring the
death of an embryo that is about to implant in her womb-or that
has already succeeded in doing so-she must also have a specially
protected liberty interest in ensuring the death of her cryopreserved embryo.
How should we assess the character and weight of the woman's
liberty interest in not becoming the genetic mother of the children
her embryos may become if gestated by other women? She might
want to secure that interest by having the embryos destroyed (or
removed from cryopreservation and allowed to die). Alternatively,
251. The Casey joint opinion suggests in dictum that Roe's concern with "postconception potential life" is also "likely to be implicated ... by some forms of contraception protected independently under Griswold and later cases .... "Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992). This dictum appears to be a veiled assertion that the
right to contraception lilrnly overlaps with the right to elective abortion prior to implantation, thereby providing an independent basis for destroying (or preventing the implantation of) pre-implantation embryos. A full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this
article, but the joint opinion's unexplained dictum is inconsistent with both the standard
dictionary definition of "contraception" as "the intentional prevention of fertilization of the
human ovum," WEI3S'l'ER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 308 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d College ed. 1980), and Roe's acknowledgement that once a woman "carries an embryo ... [t]he
situation is inherently different from marital intimacy ... or procreation." Roe, 410 U.S. at
159. In any event, even if the dictum were to become law, the interest-balancing analysis
presented in this article would appear to apply with equal force to the right to contraception once the state's interest in protecting post-conception fetal life is present.
252. See Robertson, supra note 50, at 499 n.162 ("Roe by its terms protects a woman's
interest in terminating pregnancy. It says nothing about the right to cause the destruction
of extracorporeal embryos.").
253. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
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she might prefer that the embryos simply remain cryopreserved
indefinitely, or at any rate until she herself dies. Her interest in
any of these alternatives parallels a pregnant woman's interest in
ensuring the death of her fetus. The common ground is the emotional burden she may suffer knowing that a child of hers is being
raised by others and without her. But just as the magnitude of
that emotional burden is likely to be smaller for the woman before viability than after she has given birth, it is likely to be
smaller when the woman is not pregnant at all than when she is
carrying a pre-viable fetus. 251
Thus, the state's interest in the cryopreserved embryo is on par
with its interest in the pre-viable fetus, and the woman's interest
in destroying the embryo is no greater (and likely weaker) than
her interest in destroying the fetus. Therefore, given Part Ill's
conclusion that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring that her fetus does not
survive via AW, it is a foregone conclusion that a state law forbidding the destruction of cryopreserved embryos is constitutional.
The harder question concerns laws requiring that cryopreserved embryos be gestated by the woman (or by someone to
whom she transfers custody of the embryos) within a reasonable
time, or else transferred to the state so it can search for a willing
gestational mother. As already noted, the state's interest in the
embryo's realizing its potential sooner rather than later seems
weaker than its interest in ensuring that the embryo is not destroyed. 255 On the other hand, the woman's interest in blocking
the gestation of her embryos decades after they were created
seems more likely to diminish over time than to increase. Moreover, women who are concerned that their cryopreserved embryos
may be seized by the state for gestation by a volunteer mother
can either refrain from creating cryopreserved embryos, or can
create no more embryos than they intend to use. In light of the
uncertainty about how long cryopreserved embryos can remain
capable of being gestated to term, the balance of interests favors
the state on this question as well.

254.
255.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 247-48 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In Roe, the principal claim made on behalf of the fetus was that
it is normatively human beginning at conception. 256 In Casey, the
claim that caused the plurality seriously to question Roe's soundness was that, even if the fetus is not yet normatively human, its
unique status and value as "potential human life"-that is, new
life whose nature is to become human-should outweigh the
woman's interest in an elective abortion. 257 Although the Casey
plurality declined to address that claim on the merits, it unequivocally rejected the specious inference that, because the state may
not treat the pre-viable fetus as a new, normatively human being,
the fetus has little or no intrinsic value. 258 Instead, Casey
acknowledges that the state has a "profound" interest in protecting the fetus throughout pregnancy. 259 Under Casey, therefore, the
specific question this article has addressed (i.e., "Does the right to
an elective abortion include a right to ensure the death of the previable fetus?") turns on whether the state's profound interest in
the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring
that it does not survive her elective abortion via state-provided

AW.
Although Roe and Casey imply that the life of a pre-viable fetus
is less valuable than the life of an "actual" human being (a category that may well include viable fetuses), 260 the critical question
is "how much less valuable?" Although reasonable people will disagree, the range of reasonable disagreement is not unlimited. To
treat the life of a pre-viable fetus as dramatically and disproportionately less valuable than the life of a viable fetus or an infant
is outside the range of reasonable disagreement, as well as inconsistent with Casey.
Because of the limitations of current technology, to prohibit
elective abortion means demanding both that the woman bear the
heavy burdens of an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, and
that, having done so, she face the dilemma or raising or relin-

256. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
257. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 878.
260. See Rubenfeld, supra note 94 at 635 ("[D]espite its vocabulary of potential life, the
Court in all essential respects made a determination about when the states could deem
the fetus a person." (i.e., at viability)).
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quishing her own newborn child. These are great sacrifices, as
Casey correctly realized, and thus-granting the premise that the
fetus is not yet normatively human-it is arguably reasonable to
conclude that the woman's interest in avoiding them outweighs
the state's interest in enabling the fetus to realize its potential to
become a normatively human being. 261 This article has imagined,
however, that it will someday become possible to terminate a
pregnancy in a way that is safe for the woman, while still enabling the fetus to survive the abortion and to develop to full term
in an artificial womb. If under these circumstances the state prohibits fetus-killing abortions and requires that surviving fetuses
be transferred to the state for attempted rescue in an artificial
womb, it will not be possible reasonably to conclude that the
woman's interest in a fetus-killing abortion outweighs the state's
interest in the life of the pre-viable fetus. The state will no longer
be requiring the woman to make the sacrifices involved in pregnancy and childbirth; and while it will be requiring her to relinquish her offspring to the state for attempted rescue, that is a far
less traumatic separation than a birth mother's relinquishment of
her newborn infant. Granted, by forbidding the woman to direct
that her fetus be killed before or during the termination of her
pregnancy, the state is requiring her to bear emotional burdens
that can be heavy and long-lasting. But to treat these burdens as
outweighing the life of the fetus that will by nature become a
human being if AW succeeds is implicitly to devalue fetal life far
more than Casey requires states to do when regulating elective
abortions.
This reasoning leads ineluctably to the conclusion that states
should also be free to forbid the destruction or indefinite disuse of
cryopreserved embryos. Under Casey, the state has a "profound
interest" in protecting all postconception life, 262 and cryopreserved
embryos fall within that category. No less than the implanted fetus, the cryopreserved embryo is new life that will by nature become a normatively human being. The woman's interest in preventing its development is, if anything, weaker than her interest
in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus. And the very fact
that cryopreserved embryos are deliberately created strengthens

261. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. But see Gilles, supra note 13 (arguing that the state's interest in protecting the previable fetus outweighs the woman's interests in an elective
abortion).
262. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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the case for forbidding the woman to destroy them or prevent the
state from rescuing them should the passage of time make it reasonably certain that she will never gestate them herself.

